In 'Baywatch' case, court ponders discovery rule for models' tort claims over ads posted on Facebook

Models suing an adult entertainment club occasioned the high court of Massachusetts to ponder the problem of social media and the statute of limitations on media torts in a decision Wednesday.

When I heard that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided a case about Baywatch, I knew I would want to blog about it.

Alas, I was misled. "Bay Watch" in the instant matter has nothing to do with the The Hoff or 1990s TV.

Plaintiffs allege this ad depicts model Paola Cañas.
From Compl. ex. D.

Still, it's an interesting case. Bay Watch, Inc., is the owner of an adult entertainment club in Stoughton, Massachusetts, Club Alex's. In a lawsuit filed in federal district court in June 2021, six globally recognized models alleged that Club Alex's posted their images, some of them in scant swimwear, to Facebook to promote the club, even though none of the models had any association with the club. The models alleged trademark infringement, misappropriation ("right of publicity"), defamation, and conversion.

The issue in the trial court was the statute of limitations for the state tort claims. Sitting on the generous end of the spectrum, Massachusetts allows three years for media tort claims. But the ads the plaintiffs complained about appeared from 2013 to 2015. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment on the tort claims to the defendant in 2023. But on a plaintiff motion to reconsider at the end of the year, the court agreed to certify the limitations question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).

Alas, not that one (IMDb).

The plaintiffs in the trial court had tried to avail of "the discovery rule," a common law rule that tolls the statute of limitations when it would work an unfairness on a plaintiff who is reasonably not cognizant that she suffered an injury for which there might be a legally responsible actor. 

The discovery rule gets a lot of play in toxic tort cases, in which illness alleged to have resulted from exposure to toxic substances might take years to manifest, and the risk of exposure might not even have been known to the victim at the time. Buttressing his decision with gender-equity-oriented social science, the late Judge Jack Weinstein famously used the discovery rule in the 1990s to give reprieve to plaintiffs suing the makers of DES, a once widely prescribed synthetic estrogen replacement that turned out to be dangerously carcinogenic.

The discovery rule is appealing as a matter of fairness, but applying it can introduce a thorny question of fact. And there are many more thorns when the rule is invoked in a case without the clear delimiters of physical injury.

It's often said, as a default matter, that the limitations period for media torts, such as defamation, runs from the time of publication. Usually that rule works well enough. But in some cases, plaintiffs are able to invoke the discovery rule. If cases are any indication, then defamation occurs in the disruption of business relationships more often than in the pop culture paradigm of media subject versus publisher. A businessperson, for example, might think she lost a contract on the merits of a bid and only later discover that she lost the contract upon the whisper of a false and harmful rumor into the right ear.

Proliferation of media in the internet age has made courts slightly more willing to afford plaintiffs an argument for the discovery rule, because mass media publication in a sea of online content might not rise to an injured's attention as quickly as a story in the town paper in ye olden days. But courts' patience is not without limit. In the online environment, courts have adapted another rule familiar to the conventional interplay of mass media and the discovery rule. As the SJC opined, in part quoting the Massachusetts Appeals Court:

"[W]here an alleged defamatory publication is broadly circulated to the public, and did not involve concealment or confidential communications," the discovery rule will not be applied, and the cause of action will accrue upon publication, as such widespread publication should have been discovered by the plaintiff.

In other words, the limitations period runs upon publication, unless plaintiff can invoke the discovery rule because a reasonable person would not have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor, unless the thing was out there for everyone so the plaintiff should have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor—in which case we come back around to publication again.

If that sounds circular .... Right. The problem with this approach is that if a reasonable person would not have recognized harm, cause, and actor, then, by definition, the plaintiff cannot be expected to have recognized harm, cause, and actor. In tort analysis, the word "should" means "a reasonable person would."

What this approach really allows is for the court to deny the plaintiff the latitude of the discovery rule as a matter of law, and to dismiss, without having to hassle (or Hassel) with the plaintiff's reasonable cognizance as a question of fact suitable for trial. In short, what the court giveth, the court may taketh away.

And that's what happened in the instant case. The federal district court first indicated that it was inclined to dismiss because the ads appeared too long ago. When the plaintiffs tried to invoke the discovery rule, the court was skeptical. These are world famous models with agents whose job it is to scan for unlicensed uses of clients' likenesses, and with lawyers who have sued over misappropriations before. All the same, the court concluded, credibility notwithstanding, these images were out there in the world long enough that the plaintiffs should have found out about them. So no discovery rule.

What seems to have given the court pause on reconsideration is that the images here were posted on social media. A paralegal in the employ of the plaintiffs

attested that there is no software that would allow her to efficiently search for the images in question and that Internet search engines do not search social media posts. As a result, the only available method is this "particularized research of particular establishments." It is this process, presumably, that led the plaintiffs to the defendant's Facebook posts.

But that took time.

The witness had a point. Google seems slow to index social media when it does at all. Many writers have trumpeted "the death of the search engine," as users prefer to seek answers in familiar social media not as polluted as Google search results with commercialization and distortions resulting from digital marketing under the guise of "optimization."

As well, the tech giants seem to have backed off image searching. When reverse image search first came out, I had fun seeing what famous people Google thought I looked like. Now, no matter what image I start with, Google either finds me, or finds nothing, saying, "Results for people are limited. Try searching a larger [image] area." The search tools can't have gotten dumber; that must be a choice. The SJC observed in evidence in the case that Facebook terminated its image search tool in 2021.

You see it, right?

There are now reverse image search apps, by the way, especially for celebrity matches. I'm apparently a dead ringer for UK actress Natalie Dormer (image via Flickr by Gage Skidmore CC BY-SA 2.0, cropped) or the great James Earl Jones (image via Flickr by Phil Davis CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, edited). Eat your heart out, Hollywood. The Celebs app sees me.

The federal district court thus asked the SJC to clarify how the statute of limitations works in a social media world.

In a characteristically methodical opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Scott Kafker stepped through the analysis in 25 pages. The opinion is elaborative, but it adds nothing new. The approach remains: publication, unless discovery rule, unless broad circulation. At greater length in conclusion, here is the court's explanation of the discovery rule in the context of social media:

Claims ... that arise from material posted to social media platforms accrue when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has been harmed by the defendant's publication of that material. Given how vast the social media universe is on the Internet, and how access to, and the ability to search for, social media posts may vary from platform to platform and even from post to post, that determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances regarding the social media posting, including the extent of its distribution, and the accessibility and searchability of the posting. The application of the discovery rule is therefore a highly fact-specific inquiry, and the determination of whether plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were harmed by a defendant's post on social media must often be left to the finder of fact. If, however, the material posted to social media is widely distributed, and readily accessible and searchable, a judge may determine as a matter of law that the discovery rule cannot be applied.

The record was insufficient, the SJC opined, to determine how the approach should work in the instant case. The plaintiffs had equivocated, the SJC observed, when asked when they first knew about the postings. If they knew before 2018, the court reasoned, then case over. Someone should ask them that.

It is possible for the conventional "whisper" scenario to play out on social media. The SJC cited a California case, Jones v. Reekes (Cal. Ct. App. 2022), in which plaintiff had been blocked from viewing the defendant's postings. Still, the California court concluded that the postings "were otherwise available to the public[,] and the block was easily circumventable;" moreover, the plaintiff was on alert generally to the defendant's derisive commentary. So the plaintiff was precluded from availing of the discovery rule, and the date of publication controlled.

Now I can't unsee it.

Jones was thus not exceptional as a mass media case, and I don't think Bay Watch is either. I suspect the SJC was being deferential to the federal trial court, giving it a chance to make the final call. It seems to me quite clear already that the district court did what the SJC commanded when it first ruled for the defense in 2023. The SJC having confirmed the rule, there seems little more for the district court to do but reenter that judgment.

The result might seem unfair to the assiduously searching plaintiffs, or, more precisely, their agents and lawyers. But the statute of limitations furthers meritorious competing interests, including finality in freedom from legal jeopardy on the part of all publishers.

The case in the SJC is Davalos v. Bay Watch, Inc., No. SJC-13534 (Mass. Sept. 4, 2024) (Kafker, J.) (FindLaw). The case in the federal court is Davalos v. Baywatch, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-11075 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2023) (Gorton, Dist. J.) (Court Listener).

UPDATE, Sept. 12: I was saddened to hear of James Earl Jones's passing shortly after I published this post (N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2024). All joking of resemblance aside, I was a fan.

Contemporary sculpturist comments on Ukraine war

Lakenen considers the war in Ukraine in this 2022 sculpture.

A couple of weeks ago, I visited artist Tom Lakenen's Lakenenland, a sculpture park in the Marquette area of Michigan's Upper Peninsula.

I'm a sucker for an outdoor art installation, and Lakenen's work does not disappoint. I only had a couple of hours, but I could have spent the day exploring the inviting woodsy trails.

Composed of "junk," Lakenen's art in its very existence speaks to capitalist materialism and environmental sustainability. About and even besides such themes, Lakenen has a lot to say, and much of it resonates with the ordinary American, especially in terms of economic frustrations. I could not help but notice that vehicles in the parking lot boasted bumper stickers of both "red" and "blue" American political extremes. But insofar as any visitors expressed outrage, it was along with the artist, not at him.

Lakenen is always adding new pieces. I was especially moved by his 2022 work on the war in Ukraine. Above and below, I share some images of that piece. I thank Tom Lakenen for sharing his art with visitors. All photos by RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, with no claim to underlying sculptural works, presumed © Tom Lakenen.

ACUS seeks consultant on access to public records

The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has posted a request for proposals (RFP) seeking "a consultant to produce a report on obtaining government records for use in agency proceedings."

The item might be especial interest to persons working in freedom of information, federal administrative law, or compliance.

Here is the RFP summary from ACUS:

Obtaining Government Records for Use in Agency Proceedings

Agency decision makers and private parties frequently require access to records maintained by federal agencies to decide cases and participate meaningfully in agency adjudications, investigations, and similar proceedings. In some contexts, a private party is responsible for obtaining a record from the government—sometimes by submitting a Freedom of Information Act request—and providing the record to an agency decision maker. ​In other contexts, the agency decision maker is able to access the record without action by a private party or with the private party's consent. This project will examine circumstances in which parties are responsible for obtaining federal records for use in agency proceedings, circumstances in which agencies bear primary responsibility for obtaining federal records, and the procedures by which private parties and agency decision makers obtain federal records for use in agency proceedings. It will identify agency best practices to improve the fairness, accuracy, consistency, timeliness, and efficiency of agency decision making.

Attorney Ben Birkhill is staff counsel and contact on the project. Before working for ACUS, Birkhill worked on rule and policy making for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau in the U.S. Treasury Department. ACUS is an independent, executive-branch agency charged with studying and identifying best practices to improve administrative procedure.

RFPs are due September 15, 2024. It is expected that the consultant's report will be complete in August 2025.

Religious talk touches on Jewish law, legal writing

Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

On Sunday, I had the privilege of delivering the message at my home church, in Barrington, R.I., regarding Psalm 121.

Anyone is welcome to watch the service. (The message starts at about 14:30.) The photo I referenced, from Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore, appears here, at left.

There is a bit to do with law. I talked about the Hebrew word shomer, which along with the related verb yishmar is used in some form six times in Psalm 121 to describe God as a watchman or guardian. The term has particular application in Jewish law, referring to the person who watches over the body of the deceased until burial, and to the person who is responsible for ensuring kosher standards in a kitchen.

Pictured Rocks is so named for images perceived
in the minerals and sediment. RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

I talked also about the merism, the literary device by which a writer cites two extremes to incorporate everything in between as well, or to two contrasting parts to refer to the whole. The merism is employed repeatedly in Psalm 121, for example in referring to the same "heaven and earth" described in Genesis 1:1.

Legal doublets, usually of historical origin, can be merisms. In the sermon, I used the examples of "cease and desist" and "aiding and abetting." But on further reflection, I don't think they're great examples, because the words are not so clearly contrasting. A better example would be "last will and testament," because the term once referred to two discrete documents, disposing of real and personal property, respectively. The merism thus signals that the instant document represents the whole of the testator's intentions.

Legal writers often are admonished to trim duplicative doublets, especially when the words are mere synonyms, lest they be misconstrued as narrowing specifics. But the imperative of clear and succinct writing sometimes should give way to the value in a term of art, which incorporates an established meaning, and in a true merism, which conveys the meaning of expansive entirety.

UPDATE, Oct. 26, 2024: Message now available on YouTube.

Law student leads protests in Kenya

Socioeconomic unrest and youth protests are roiling Kenya, and President William Ruto seems unable to get a grip on the discontent. Freelance journalist Kimu Elolia told This American Life last week the story of Nairobi protest leader "Ospina," a 27-year-old law student.

I wrote in summer 2022 about the most recent Kenyan presidential election, shortly after I visited there. The election broke new ground in Kenya, as neither leading candidate was of Kikuyu ethnicity. Term limits had run on two-term, 10-year President Uhuru Kenyatta.

In 2022, I made a new friend at the Nairobi Giraffe Centre.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

A friend in Kenya whose political commentary I trust rather favored the candidate who did not prevail in the 2022 election, Raila Odinga. Though a product of a dynastic political family with see-sawing past fortunes, my friend saw Odinga, who is of Luo ethnicity, as the best prospect to combat corruption, which my friend saw as Kenya's top political problem.

Odinga lost to William Ruto, whose wary-smile-inducing "Every Hustle Counts"-themed billboards were ubiquitous in my travels in Kenya. Like incumbent Kenyatta, Ruto, of Kalenjin ethnicity, had a history of corruption charges in the International Criminal Court—dismissed—though Kenyatta endorsed Odinga. Ruto nevertheless rode to victory on strong promises of economic prosperity, which spoke to a powerful current of economic discontent in Kenya, especially among youth.

In May, Ruto had a high-profile visit with President Biden at the White House. Bilateral discussion covered climate, human rights, and most importantly, to Kenyans, economics. In the latter vein, the White House pledged to help Kenya work out a "financial architecture" that will ease an economy that Kenyans see as shackled by onerous debts and expectations in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Protest in Kenya in June.
Capital FM Kenya CC BY 3.0

The White House summit did not pacify the masses. In June, Ruto pushed a tax hike through Parliament, and violence erupted. Youth protestors laid siege to Parliament and burned part of the building. They demanded Ruto's resignation, which was not forthcoming. (Read more from The AP. I found the worrying events in Kenya profoundly under-reported in U.S. media, while ample time was spent dissecting our surreal horse race.)

The protests are dragging on, and the rule of law remains under severe threat in East Africa's largest economy. The government is disregarding human rights norms, outlawing dissent, even the waving of the national flag (N.Y. Times). Dozens of protesters have been arrested; human rights groups further allege state-sponsored abductions and torture.

Last week, freelance journalist and producer Kimu Elolia, formerly with The Intercept, told This American Life the story of Nairobi protest leader "Ospina," a 27-year-old law student. Elolia told TAL's Ira Glass that Kenyans tire of seeing political leaders such as Ruto riding in private jets and sporting Rolexes, while ordinary people are asked to shoulder more and more economic burdens. Ospina has been more involved than his mother cares for.

As law faculty and students, including me, return to classes this week and next in the United States, we might be thankful that onerous reading assignments and research expectations (or in my case, strategic planning) will be our most daunting challenges. We ought not take for granted that we enjoy the rule of law—if we can keep it.

The moving segment is "Mom Thinks He Doth Protest Too Much," in Swim Towards the Shark, This American Life (Aug. 9, 2024).

Curators decry parody souvenirs, claim quasi-copyright

D 'n' me at the Accademia in June.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0

David's genitals are all the rage in Florentine touristic fashion, and some observers see a kind of intellectual property (IP) problem.

Italian law has pioneered the protection of cultural heritage since the 15th century (Mannoni), centuries before Italian unification. Medici rulers limited the export of art in the 19th century (Calabi). In the 20th century, a 1909 law asserted a public interest in protecting items "at least 50 years old and 'of historical, archaeological, paleo-anthropological interest'" (N.Y. Times).

Italy continued to lead in protective legal measures in modern times. A public responsibility to safeguard the national patrimony was enshrined in the post-war constitution in 1948 and became the basis of a "complex public organization" (Settis). According to Giambrone Law, Italy was the first nation to have a police division specially assigned to protect cultural heritage. Italy embraced a 2022 European treaty on cultural protection with aggressive amendments to domestic criminal law (LoC). Woe be to the Kazakh tourist who carved his initials into a Pompeii wall this summer (e.g., Smithsonian).

Italian legal protection has extended beyond the physical. A 2004 code of cultural heritage limited visual reproductions of national patrimony without prior approval by the controlling institution and payment of a fee to the institution. 

That measure caused more than a little hand-wringing in copyright circles, as the law seemed to reclaim art from the public domain. The Italian Ministry of Culture doubled down with regulations in 2023, even as the EU moved to strengthen the single-market IP strategy.

Probably needless to say, images of famous works of Italian art are sold widely, in Italy and elsewhere, on everything from frameable prints to refrigerator magnets. Enforcement of the cultural heritage law is thin on the ground, but the government has scored some significant wins against high-profile violators.

A recent AP News story by Coleen Barry described the latest outbreak of this IP-vs.-free-speech conflict, this time over images of David. Cecilie Hollberg, director of the Galleria dell’Accademia, where David resides, has decried vendors who profit from "debase[ment]" of David's image.

Aprons for sale, 2010.
Willem via Flickr CC BY-SA 2.0

I saw David in late June. It was the second time I visited him; my first visit was in 1996. I don't well remember Florence from that long ago. But this time I surely was surprised by the quantity and variety of David gear available for sale on the streets around the Accademia, especially the sort of gear that Hollberg is talking about. David has become a character in every variety of indecent meme and crude joke about drinking and sex. David's penis is a favorite outtake.

These uses of David's image especially implicate moral rights in copyright law. Moral rights aim to protect the dignity of creators against distasteful uses and associations. However, as such, moral rights typically end with the life of the creator. Michelangelo died in 1564. The theory behind the cultural heritage code is indicated by the very word "patrimony": that there is a kind of inherited public ownership of classical works, thus entitling them to ongoing moral protection.

Copyright in U.S. law and in the common law tradition in the 20th century was slow to recognize moral rights, which have a storied history in continental law, especially in France and in the civil law tradition. But common law countries came around, at least most of the way. Broader recognition of moral rights was motivated principally by treaty obligations seeking to harmonize copyright. A secondary motivation might have been a proliferation of offensiveness in the multimedia age.

Hollberg has been the complainant behind multiple enforcement actions. Barry reported: "At Hollberg's behest, the state's attorney office in Florence has launched a series of court cases invoking Italy's landmark cultural heritage code .... The Accademia has won hundreds of thousands of euros in damages since 2017, Hollberg said." Not a bad side hustle.

David's shapely backside is not to be underestimated.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0

EU regulators are looking into the legal conflict between free artistic expression and protection of cultural heritage, Barry wrote. My inclination to classical liberalism puts a thumb on the scale for me in favor of the commercial appropriators. I'm uncomfortable with inroads on the public domain. There already is excessive such impingement on creative freedom: inter alia, abusively lengthy copyright terms, chaos around orphan works, prophylactic notice and take-down, and publisher-defined fair use. The idea of removing permissible uses from the public domain is antithetical to liberal norms.

At the same time, I get the frustration of authorities. The average family visiting the dignified Accademia, eager to induce a much-needed appreciation for history and art in the youngest generation, first must navigate the cultural gutter.

Trademark feud centers on unsolved double murder

Lizzie Borden House, left; Miss Lizzie's Coffee, right.

A museum and a coffee shop are locked in trademark litigation over the name of an heiress accused of an infamous double murder. (All photos by RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.)

Last year, Williamsburg, Va.-based US Ghost Adventures, owner-operator of the Lizzie Borden House and Museum in Fall River, Mass., sued Miss Lizzie's Coffee and its owner-operator, Joseph M. Pereira. The coffee shop opened in a house next door to the museum on Second Street in Fall River. US Ghost Adventures accused Miss Lizzie's of infringing on its trademark in "Lizzie Borden" and profiting from consumer confusion over the coffee shop's ownership.

In October, the federal district court, per Judge Leo T. Sorokin, denied the plaintiff a preliminary injunction. US Ghost Adventures appealed, and the matter is now pending in the First Circuit.

In 1892, Lizzie Borden was tried and acquitted of the axe murders of her father and stepmother. The brutality of the killings and the gender of the accused summed a blockbuster news event in the 1890s—not coincidentally, the pyrite age of yellow journalism—and the public followed the criminal trial breathlessly. No one ever was convicted of the crime, and Borden lived the remainder of her life under a cloud in Fall River social circles. The case has been a font of endless speculation in the popular culture, inspiring books, articles, films, TV shows, video games, songs, and nursery rhymes.

Lizzie Borden House and Museum

Opened to the public in 1996, the Lizzie Borden House and Museum, where the murders occurred and Lizzie lived at the time, features artifacts from the Bordens' life and the crime. The bed-and-breakfast part of the business capitalizes on the reputation of the property as haunted.

In August 2023, Pereira opened the coffee shop in a house adjacent to the Borden House. There is no confusion about what "Miss Lizzie's" refers to. The shop features images of Lizzie, boasts an overall theme of bloody death, and sells small souvenirs related to the Lizzie Borden story. US Ghost Adventures sued in September 2023.

"Hatchet blade" mark
registered to US Ghost Adventures
USPTO

While there is no confusion over the fact that both businesses aim to profit off the Lizzie Borden story, that overlap in itself does not constitute a trademark infringement. The defendants argued in federal district court, and the court agreed, that Lizzie Borden's name and image, and the story of the Borden murders are in the public domain. Trademark specifically protects only the brand name of the Lizzie Borden House and Museum as a hospitality service provider.

(UPDATE, Aug. 7: US Ghost Adventures has registered marks in "Lizzie Borden" and in its hatchet-blade graphic (pictured) for "hotel and restaurant services," which, I admit, comes closer to a coffee shop than mere hospitality. I would still draw the line. US Ghost Adventures also has registered "Lizzie Borden Museum" for "museum services" and the hatchet-blade image for key chains, jewelry, mugs, golf balls, hats, shirts, etc. Search "Lizzie Borden" at the USPTO for full details. HT@ Prof. Anoo Vyas.)

The trademark test for "consumer confusion" about who is the service provider presents, essentially, a frame-of-reference problem. US Ghost Adventures says that its trademark precludes another hospitality service provider from using the Lizzie Borden name, or anything confusingly similar thereto, and a coffee shop is a hospitality business. The defendants argued, and the court agreed, that a coffee shop is a sufficiently different enterprise from a bed and breakfast as not to induce consumer confusion.

Miss Lizzie's Coffee

It's not that a coffee shop could not infringe the trademark, but that this one has not, the trial court concluded. The plaintiff tried to tighten the connection between the two businesses by pointing to their proximate location and their common uses of hatchets in signs and promotional images. The court found neither proffer convincing. It makes sense to locate any Borden-themed business near the scene of the crime, and the hatchet images the businesses use are different. Lest there be any lingering doubt in a customer's mind, the coffee shop put up a sign avowing its non-association.

(There is some dispute as well about the difference between a hatchet and an axe, which was used in the murder, and which is depicted where. I don't have the bandwidth to, uh, chop through that thicket.)

Notwithstanding the plaintiff's appeal, I think the trial court got it right. Judge Sorokin convincingly suggested by way of example that trademark law does not preclude a business from using the historical name of Sam Adams, as long as the business isn't a brew works. In the same vein, in any close case, I prefer to see trademark law construed as not at cross-purposes with economic development, which Fall River can use. More touristic business floats all boats.

As the appeal unfolds in the First Circuit, an unfortunate and layered backstory is coming to light. For reasons unstated in the record—one might fairly speculate the burden of attorney fees—Pereira discharged his two lawyers, who withdrew from the case in April 2024. In July 2024, Pereira responded pro se to the appellant-plaintiff's brief. 

US Ghost Adventures was able to sue both Pereira and Miss Lizzie's because, according to the allegations, Periera opened the shop about a month before his business registration was formalized. The plaintiff therefore demanded that Pereira personally disgorge ill-gotten profits from that first month.

The problem now on appeal is that a corporation cannot be represented pro se, and Pereira is not an attorney. So his responsive brief, already shaky on legal formalities, cannot represent the position of Miss Lizzie's. The court accordingly ordered that Miss Lizzie's would not be permitted to argue on appeal. In an August 1 reply, the plaintiff then asked the court to decline oral argument entirely, as Pereira inevitably would argue Miss Lizzie's position in violation of the court's order. 

As I said, I think the plaintiff is wrong on the merits, so the First Circuit should affirm. And that would be the safe bet in ordinary circumstances.

But the plaintiff's reply fairly faults Pereira for thin legal arguments in the pro se brief. That puts the appellate court in an awkward position. Even if the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on appeal, the First Circuit is looking at a record short on effective counterargument. 

Considering the preliminary disposition of the proceeding in the trial court, the appellate court might err on the side of reversing and remanding, to develop a fuller trial record. The defendants' pro se bind will persist, though, and would threaten an outcome dictated by access to counsel rather than the case on the merits.

There's a deeper layer yet. It happens that Pereira has a troubled history with the law. According to The Standard-Times, in 1996, he "pleaded guilty to stealing more than $119,000 from 15 people after posing as a lawyer and mortgage broker." Appearing as an attorney in a 1993 housing matter, Pereira "was so good, witnesses say, that ... he stood up to a judge, a clerk and another attorney without even raising an eyebrow," The Standard-Times reported in 1995. A veteran attorney said that "he never suspected a thing," and that Pereira "was very polite and seemed pretty knowledgeable about the lead-paint law."

Pereira's record did not improve subsequently. In 2010, he was sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment after "he pleaded guilty to 13 counts of larceny, one count of practicing law without a license and one count of committing that offense after being convicted of the crime in 1996," Wicked Local reported in 2012. As The Herald News put it upon an arrest in 2019: "Since 1982, Pereira has been arraigned approximately three-dozen times on larceny-related charges. His most recent arrest added another 17 larceny charges to his record." He did beat some charges.

To Pereira's credit, I did not think his response in the First Circuit was as devoid of reasoning as US Ghost Adventures alleged. Albeit in improper form, the appellee's brief more or less rehashed the core arguments in the case. If in proper form, that's what the appellant's brief did, too.

Certainly Pereira's criminal history should have no bearing on the trademark case. The case also, ideally, should not be decided based on either party's access to counsel, though such immateriality of resources is not the way of the American legal system, especially on the civil side.

Whatever comes to pass procedurally, I stand by my assessment of the merits. On Friday morning, I picked up a cup of coffee at Miss Lizzie's.

The appellate case is US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC, No. 23-2000 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 27, 2023). The case in the trial court is US Ghost Adventures, LLC v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC, No. 1:23-cv-12116-LTS (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2023) (CourtListener).

Wood wins Rappaport Fellowship

Rebecca Wood
BC Law

Rebecca Wood, a survivor of my 1L torts classes, has won a prestigious Rappaport Fellowship in law and public policy.

Wood became active in politics after the premature birth of her daughter raised urgent questions for her family about the inadequacies of insurance and healthcare in America. Check out her story as told while working on Medicare-for-all legislation with Bernie Sanders in 2017. She testified movingly before the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee in 2019. 

Wood enrolled in law school as a Public Interest Fellow to attain a law degree that will arm her for public policy work. She was a pleasure to have in class, because she is insightful and sensitive to the powerful public policy implications of tort law. She will be a formidable force for good, and I'm privileged to be a part of her education.

At Boston College, "[t]he Rappaport Fellows Program in Law and Public Policy provides gifted students committed to public policy careers with opportunities to experience the complexities and rewards of public policy and public service within the highest levels of state and municipal governments." Wood spent the summer as an intern at the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office.

New book examines 'rise of classical legal thought' through experience of South Asia, British Empire

Professor Chaudhry
UMass Law

Professor Faisal Chaudhry has published a book on history and the development of classical legal thought.

South Asia, the British Empire, and the Rise of Classical Legal Thought: Toward a Historical Ontology of Law (2024) is available now from Oxford University Press. Here is the publisher's description:

This book delves into the legal history of colonial governance in South Asia, spanning the period from 1757 to the early 20th century. It traces a notable shift in the way sovereignty, land control, and legal rectification were conceptualized, particularly after 1858. During the early phase of the rule of the East India Company, the focus was on 'the laws' that influenced the administration of justice rather than 'the law' as a comprehensive normative system. The Company's perspective emphasized absolute property rights, particularly concerning land rent, rather than physical control over land. This viewpoint was expressed through the obligation of revenue payment, with property existing somewhat outside the realm of law. This early colonial South Asian legal framework differed significantly from the Anglo-common law tradition, which had already developed a unified and physical concept of property rights as a distinct legal form by the late 18th century. It was only after the transfer of authority from the Company to the British Crown, along with other shifts in the imperial political economy, that the conditions were ripe for 'the law' to emerge as an autonomous and fundamental institutional concept. One of the contributing factors to this transformation was the emergence of classical legal thought. Under Crown rule, two distinct forms of discourse contributed to reshaping the legal ontology around the globalized notion of 'the law' as an independent concept. The book, adopting a historical approach to jurisprudence, categorizes these forms as doctrinal discourse, which could articulate propositions of the law with practical and administrative qualities, and ordinary language discourse, which conveyed ideas about the law, including in the public domain.

Professor Chaudhry is a valued colleague of mine. I admire his critical and historical approach to first-year property, with which he complements my social and economic emphases in teaching torts.

'Faculty are the least important people on a campus,' but don't worry; administrators will be all right

Adaptation of Joe Loong via Flickr CC BY-SA 2.0

A recent item in The Chronicle of Higher Education (subscription), excerpted by Paul Caron on TaxProf Blog, well captures what it feels like to be a professor in American higher ed nowadays.

The Chronicle item, by Beckie Supiano, talks about tenured and tenure-track professors leaving the "dream job" of academia. Author and consultant Karen Kelsky founded a private Facebook group, now counting 33,000 members, as a virtual home for the disillusioned: "The Professor is Out."

Supiano quoted Kelsky:

"The faculty are the least important people on a campus right now," Kelsky says. If colleges valued their work, she says, they wouldn't have allowed "adjunctification" to happen in the first place. The current wave of faculty departures—which colleges don't even seem to have acknowledged—is simply the latest twist in a decades-long deterioration.

"Institutions' indifference to faculty leaving," she says, "is a reflection of their indifference to faculty's being there."

To some professors, the job they've worked so hard for feels untenable. And that's particularly true for those who ... pour themselves into their positions and strive to connect with students on a personal level. That's something that colleges sell to students, but it's not something they seem actually willing to invest in.

Right: especially that first line about faculty being the least important people on campus. Though "right now" might erroneously suggest a new condition. Rather, this lament is the familiar theme of the widely referenced book by Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why It Matters, in 2011, when the data already were ample.

Despite Ginsberg calling out the trend more than a decade ago, nothing has changed. Faculty governance is practically a dead letter. Faculty work not only for provosts and chancellors, but for every support service office on campus, such as information technology and human resources. We're told when and where, and increasingly how and what to show up and teach. Worse, we're loaded down with hamster-wheeling administrative work. It seems that every new administrator means more work for me, too. I feel ever more like Lucy on the assembly line.

This state of affairs was a refrain at last week's Niagara Conference on Workplace Mobbing (more to come about the conference here at The Savory Tort). In the same vein, I heard mounting faculty anxiety over AI. If universities, as the bottom-line businesses they've become, care about the delivery of services almost to the exclusion of quality, then they will gravitate to the worker that never sleeps and never whines about the rising costs of housing, healthcare, and college for our own kids.

In my workplace, "adjunctification," as Kelsky put it, manifests as noncompetitive compensation for both part-time and full-time faculty. A first-year attorney in Big Law makes substantially more than any of the teaching faculty at the law school where I work—

—excluding deans. A university's priorities ring clear when one compares the qualifications and salaries of teaching faculty with salaries in the bureaucracy. Judge my shop for yourself with a recent top-100 round-up at South Coast Today (or look up anyone in the Massachusetts public sector). Be wary of listed titles. At no. 32, I'm the top paid, still serving, and exclusively teaching "professor." Other "professors" at nos. 5-30 had or have admin roles that fattened the bankroll. The money is in admin and overhead, even while students strain to see the return on that investment.

Indeed, as Kelsky suggests, most of us, teaching faculty, still "strive to connect with students on a personal level," despite lack of incentives to do so. That's probably because it's the character flaw of human compassion that draws us to teaching. I'm working on it: trying to be a good worker by caring less and keeping the assembly line moving. "Speed it up a little!" Maybe, for students' sake, AI will meet us halfway in the humanity game.