Wrongful death depends on viability of decedent's action at time of death, Mass. high court rules

Via Picryl

When a statute of limitations precluded smokers' suits against tobacco makers, the smokers' families also could not sue in wrongful death after the smokers died, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in July.

It's harder nowadays, than it once was late in the last century, for smokers to sue Big Tobacco for the health consequences of smoking. In accordance with the peculiar lifecycle of many product liability theories, tobacco makers have acquired strong defenses against smokers who persist despite now well known risks. There are occasional plaintiff wins, still. But over time, fewer cases can pass muster by proving recent manifestation of injury incurred long ago.

In one strategy to circumvent the natural expiration of product liability exposure, Massachusetts plaintiffs, whose family members succumbed to smoking-related illnesses, theorized that wrongful death in commonwealth statute is a cause of action independent of the decedent's causes for personal injury. In this theory, the wrongful death action comes into being only upon the death of the decedent and might resist defenses that would have defeated the decedents' own personal injury claims—namely, the statute of limitations.

In the consolidated Fabiano v. Philip Morris USA Inc. and Fuller v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the plaintiffs alleged negligence and breach of warranty pursuant to the wrongful death statute, even while they did not dispute that the smoker-decedents, plaintiffs' family members, could not have sued in personal injury at the time of death because of the expiry of the limitations period for those actions. Accordingly, there also could be no survival claims in the names of the decedents.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' theory, affirming the judgment of the courts below in favor of the defendants. Even though it has its own statute of limitations, wrongful death was nonetheless intended by the legislature to be a derivative cause of action, the court opined. The cause vests in family only if the decedent has a viable cause at the time of death.

The court had said as much before as to personal injury actions, so affirmed that rule, and moreover held that plaintiffs in Fabiano and Fuller failed to distinguish breach of warranty claims. All of the family's liability theories are constrained by the wrongful death statute, and so by its limitations.

The court acknowledged that not every state agrees. Colorado and West Virginia seem to regard the wrongful death action as an independent statutory action. But they are out of step with the "overwhelming majority" rule in the states, the court observed.

In teaching torts, I prefer to describe wrongful death claims as "parasitic," rather than "derivative." The concepts are not co-extensive, but both terms capture the notion of dependency on the underlying personal injury claim. I admit, I had never considered the plaintiffs' theory and did not know about the Colorado and West Virginia approach.

There is a logic to the minority rule. A wrongful death claim means to compensate "parasitic plaintiffs" for their losses, not the losses of the decedent. The wrongful death plaintiff thus does not incur injury until the time of death. At the same time, the policy of the statute of limitations attached to the decedent's claim, which statute protects defendants against excessive liability exposure, is somewhat undermined by tacking on the enduring potential of a recovery upon death at an indefinite later time.

Justice David A. Lowy wrote the court's unanimous opinion in Fabiano and Fuller, No. SJC-13282 & No. SJC-13346 (Mass. July 6, 2023) (FindLaw).

Libro estudia poder de corte constitucional ecuatoriana

El abogado Ugo Stornaiolo Silva ha publicado un libro, Jueces Como Soberanos: Una Exploración Jurídico-Política del Poder Supremo de la Corte Constitucional Ecuatoriana (Amazon). (English below.)

Stornaiolo es un abogado ecuatoriano y estudiante de LL.M. Nos conocimos cuando él era estudiante mío en el Programa de Derecho Americano de la Universidad Católica de América en la Universidad Jagellónica de Cracovia, Polonia. Visitó generosamente mi clase de Derecho Comparado en UMass, a través de Zoom en la primavera, para hablar sobre derecho constitucional comparado, especialmente a la luz de notables decisiones recientes de los tribunales ecuatorianos con respecto a los derechos indígenas y los derechos de la naturaleza.

Aquí está el resumen del libro nuevo.

Por lo dispuesto en la Constitución actualmente vigente, la Corte Constitucional ecuatoriana es una de las instituciones más importantes del diseño constitucional ecuatoriano, y sus extensos poderes, sin contrapesos o fiscalización, podrían sugerir que es un ente soberano dentro de nuestro país frente a una institucionalidad de poderes separados que no puede ejercer sus funciones fuera de su control.

Sin embargo, la soberanía de la Corte Constitucional no es un fenómeno expreso, por lo que demostrar su condición soberana podría significar un cambio de paradigma en el entendimiento crítico de nuestro propio ordenamiento político y jurídico.

Stornaiolo escribe para el websitio, The Libertarian Catholic (El Católico Libertario). Para conocer una muestra en inglés de su trabajo sobre el constitucionalismo ecuatoriano, consulte su artículo de 2021,  "Originalism and Textualism Are Not Enough Against Constitutional Lawfare" ("El Originalismo y el Textualismo No Son Suficientes Contra la Guerra Jurídica Constitucional").

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Attorney Ugo Stornaiolo Silva has published a book, Jueces Como Soberanos: Una Exploración Jurídico-Política del Poder Supremo de la Corte Constitucional Ecuatoriana (Judges as Sovereigns: A Legal-Political Exploration of the Supreme Power of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court) (Amazon).

Stornaiolo is an Ecuadorean lawyer and LL.M. student. We met when he was a student in my class in the American Law Program of The Catholic University of America at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. He generously visited my Comparative Law class at UMass, via Zoom in the spring, to talk about comparative constitutional law, especially in light of recent noteworthy decisions by Ecuadorian courts regarding indigenous rights and the rights of nature.

Here is the précis of the book (my translation).

Based on constitutional law as presently in force, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court is one of the most important institutions in the Ecuadorian constitutional design, and its extensive powers, without checks or oversight, could suggest that it is a sovereign entity within our country, in opposition to the separation-of-powers framework, by which one cannot exercise power beyond the scope of authority.

However, the sovereignty of the Constitutional Court is not an explicit phenomenon, so demonstrating its sovereign condition could mean a paradigm shift in the critical understanding of our own political and juridical order.

Stornaiolo writes for the website, The Libertarian Catholic. For a taste in English of his work on Ecuadorian constitutionalism, check out his 2021, paper,   "Originalism and Textualism Are Not Enough Against Constitutional Lawfare."

Journal of Civic Information seeks associate editor

If you're a transparency scholar looking for a side hustle, check out the posting by the Journal of Civic Information seeking an associate editor.

Present editor and FOI advocate extraordinaire David Cuillier has moved into the leadership role at Florida's Brechner Center, so he needs someone new at the helm of the journal. The associate editorship is a three-year gig with a $2,500 annual stipend.

I serve on the Journal's Editorial Board. So you know it's a worthy cause.

The deadline for application is October 1, 2023.

Russians travel in Asia despite, or because of, war

An Aeroflot plane awaits departure in Almaty, Kazakhstan,
earlier this month. EU and U.S. sanctions banned the airline in 2022.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

A joke, belatedly to honor Ukraine Independence Day, August 24.

This summer, traveling in the Caucasus and Central Asia, I crossed a lot of borders. Sometimes back and across again.

I also met a lot of Russians. Most often, we exchanged pleasantries, as if there were nothing going on in the wider world. I didn't want to ask, and they seemed content not to talk about it.

I did meet a number of Russian men who had fled conscription. One fellow, late 20s I estimate, in a craft-beer bar in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, was especially warm company. We never talked directly about Putin's position on Ukraine. But he made clear that he believed Russia's war adventure is socially and economically disastrous for ordinary Russians at home.

Anyway, my friends and I grew accustomed to the questions asked by immigration officials with limited English.

Usually, the border officer asked,

"Occupation?"

"No," a Russian traveler answered.

"Just visiting."

Can Arsenal supporter be impartial in football inquiry?

A curious story of lawyering ethics and football allegiance broke in mid-May, just after I went off contract with UMass Law and left the States for a chunk of the summer.

Manchester City Football Club (City, or MCFC), my team, won a historic "treble" over the summer, topping the Premier League, FA Cup, and UEFA Champions League.

Thomas Jefferson, me, and a City kit
at Hofstra University, 2016
Morgan Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

While City was on its spring tear, a modest shadow was cast by allegations of violations of "fair play" financial regulations in the Premier League for transactions dating to 2009 to 2018. From as much as is publicly known, the allegations focus on financial transparency requirements. Any ultimate finding of violation can have consequences going forward, ranging from fines to relegation from top-tier play.

City denies any misfeasance. In 2020, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) reversed a UEFA suspension of City for alleged violation of the financial regulations related to transactions from 2012 to 2016. The CAS decision was based principally on the exclusion of dated evidence, so the matter was not resolved on the merits. City then also denied any wrongdoing.

The present allegations, which themselves are reported to arise from a four-year investigation, have been referred to an independent commission. Its behind-closed-doors work will take a while. And City can be expected to litigate any adverse result.

The piece of the story that caused me to scratch my chin in May was the report that City had filed objection to the appointment of an Arsenal FC supporter, Murray Rosen KC, as chair of the independent commission.

Under rules of professional conduct in American law practice, being a fan of a sport team would not preclude a lawyer from representing a competitor. American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.7 focuses on conflicts in legal representation, not matters of social affiliation. Of course, the question comes down to the lawyer's ability to do the job "competent[ly]" and "diligent[ly]," so it's always possible for a lawyer to be compromised by sporting fervor. The best course is disclosure and client consent.

For a judge, ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 similarly, probably, would not demand a sport-fan judge's recusal from a matter involving a competitor. The requisite "personal bias or prejudice" is usually indicated by concrete evidence such as financial interest, familial affiliation, or former representation, not social preference.

More than lawyer ethics, the judicial canons give weight to public perception, testing expressly for objective perception of impartiality. But being a sport fan, absent economic investment, doesn't move that needle.

For example, in a fraud lawsuit settled confidentially five years ago, plaintiffs accused the New York Giants and players, including quarterback Eli Manning, of American football, of passing off memorabilia falsely as game worn. The plaintiffs asked New Jersey Superior Court Judge James J. DeLuca to recuse, because he was a Giants fan and, with his son, owned professional seat licenses—that's something, economically—to attend Giants games. DeLuca declined to recuse and pledged on the record his ability to remain impartial. All good, legal commentators opined. (E.g., NJ.com.)

JAMS guidelines for arbitrators are at least as permissive. Like the judicial canons, the guidelines look to both actual conflict and objective appearance of conflict. JAMS guidelines expressly condone "social or professional relationships with lawyers and members of other professions" as long as they do not "impair impartiality."

I don't know what ethics constraints pertain to Rosen, but I'm doubtful they are any more demanding. I also don't know, though, how deeply Rosen bleeds Arsenal red and white. City's filing is secret, so it's possible there's evidence of conflict that the public can't see.

Nothing in Rosen's public record raises a red flag. Based in London, he's a CAS-certified arbitrator and mediator. Any European professional, especially a Brit, and especially someone working in sport law, can be expected to favor a club or two in association football. Rosen was called to the bar in 1976. He's practiced media, sport, and art law and has served in a wide range of offices, even once chairman of the board of appeal of English Table Tennis.

A biography of Rosen at 4 Square Chambers, pre-dating the City matter, reported:

He is a strong believer in fairness and in the power and benefits of sport and has a keen appreciation of its social, political and financial aspects. He has participated in sport all his life, is a member of the MCC [I presume, Marylebone Cricket Club] and Arsenal FC, and still regularly plays real tennis and ping pong.

A 2019 biography at Herbert Smith Freehills mentioned in parentheses that Rosen "is an Arsenal season ticket holder." Arsenal of course was a contender for trophies City won in the end in its treble. But, at least upon what is publicly known, Arsenal has no direct interest in the financial regulatory matters, any more than another competing club.

The objection to Rosen might be part of a kitchen-sink litigation strategy, or, more likely, a public relations strategy. It's frustrating not being able to know the substance of the objection (or nearly anything about sport governance matters that wind up before CAS). On the public record, at least, the objection on ethics grounds doesn't seem to hold water.

In any event, the allegations against City do nothing to dampen my celebration of the treble! I wore my Erling Haaland kit to law school orientation just last week.

Curmudgeon speaks on decline of grammar, civilization

Deteriorating grammar and style conventions signal the crumbling of western civilization.

I'm a grammar-and-style curmudgeon, so take my declaration with a grain of salt. Still, I feel pretty confident about it.

When I was in journalism school, in what was then still called the "print" program, I and my cohort were allowed to make one technical mistake in a story without penalty. 

A freebie. One. Of whatever kind: spelling, grammar, style. After that, the grade plummeted precipitously. I tested the system with carelessness just once, and it was damage enough to deprive me of an A for the semester.

Nowadays I find I have to give student papers separate reads for technical and substance. There are so many technical problems in the average draft that I can't focus on the substance at the same time. I give separate grades for tech and substance, too, before I combine them in a formula weighted in favor of substance.

In fairness, most of my students did not go to journalism school. As American legal education is open to all majors, some students have not written since grade school. Our ranks include accounting majors who took only math-oriented tests in non-liberal arts bachelor's programs. (How is that even a thing?) Where they are on tech is not their fault, but a failure of American K16 education. My foreign students who speak English as a second language usually exhibit better tech skills than the average American 1L—notwithstanding telltale struggle with the confounding rules of definite and indefinite articles.

I'm proud of my daughter, who went to a public school that, exceptionally, emphasized writing. We chose where we live for the school. She didn't love the heavy writing emphasis at the time, and fair enough. But when she went to arts school for university, she was shocked by how poorly prepared her peers were in writing, including those who wished to build careers writing creatively for TV and film. Her skill in writing set her apart, as it continues to in the workforce.

Many students who struggle initially, to their credit, embrace my feedback, readily extrapolate appropriate rules, and greatly improve their writing. Some students masochistically seek out my writing tutelage because they know they've been cheated in their education and want to improve. Of course, a few resent and resist the feedback. The quality of legal writing in the everyday practice of law suggests that they're not wrong about where the norm falls. 

Just spend a few hours in the briefs at any courthouse, and you'll see what I mean. When I started teaching legal writing in 1998, I went to the courthouse in Little Rock, Arkansas, to compile some model practice documents for my students' reference. I found almost nothing I could hold up as exemplary. That was disappointing but educational.

As my reputation precedes me, my 1L students sometimes worry over whether I'll knock them down for grammar on final exams. I won't, I tell them, unless a misusage creates ambiguity or otherwise impedes the reader's understanding. That does happen. But even I have now and then mistyped a "your" instead of "you're" when writing under time pressure, phonetic ideation direct to fingers. Timed exams are not research papers or practice documents.

UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh wrote ably for Reason earlier this week on the use of "they" as a singular pronoun. Like his academic legal writing, his Academic Legal Writing is superb, and I routinely recommend it. Like he, apparently, I have long counseled students on ways to avoid singular constructions that invite the problem of generic gendered pronouns. When working over the text doesn't work—sometimes, the difference between singular and plural is required by legal precision—I recommend "he or she," however cumbersome.

Nowadays the problem of singular "they" bleeds into the issue of gender identity. I am sympathetic with how that "they" emerged amid the failure of "ze" or another creative alternative. When that "they" is used, it is treated grammatically as a plural, even if the person is singular. I'm not here opining on that issue. Professor Volokh gave the best advice, anyway: essentially, know your audience.

I give students the same advice generally. Maybe the judge in your case was an accounting major and will be satisfied as long as you can string sentences together into recognizable paragraphs. But maybe your judge is a curmudgeon. If a student needs a better reason to know the rules than because they're the rules, then it serves to know that it might pay, literally, to be highly fluent in the lingua franca.

I've been thinking about this not only because of Professor Volokh's item, but because I returned to my home state of Rhode Island last week to be confronted with two curiosities on newspaper fronts at my local grocery store.  Here's the Barrington Times of August 13:

Barrington Times, Aug. 16,  2023: "'None of these fields are getting rest.'"

This headline is not necessarily wrong, for a couple of reasons. But it gave me pause, frozen for a time in the grocery store portico.

The conventional wisdom is that the word "none" is a contraction of "not one." So, like "one," usually, "none" should take a singular subject. The line should be, then, "None of these fields is getting rest."

At the same time, what we might call "linguistic originalists" point to a long history of English-language usage tolerating both singular and plural treatment of "none." The rule oft recited today is that "none" should be treated as a plural when it reads as "not any," or when the range of things to which it refers is plural. So if the subject of the headline is "not any of these fields," then "are" is suitable.

I find that rule profoundly unhelpful, because there is no real difference between "not one" and "not any."  "Not one" almost invariably refers to a range of multiple candidates. Many sources on grammar give examples in which plural usage pertains to the subject structure "none of [them/these/etc.]," but that's not a sensible distinction either. The headline statement here is wholly equivalent to "none is getting rest," were the line to appear in a context in which the adjectival phrase "of these fields" were unnecessary for clarity.

Other sources use a flexible rule in which the writer chooses based on emphasis. Treating the subject as singular emphasizes the singularity. That's hardly a rule. But if it pertained, I would contend that the above usage is wrong. For if one field were rested at any given time, there would be no newsworthy assertion that a new field is needed.

I recognize, too, by the way, that the headline is a quote. According to my old-school journalistic rules, a quote can be changed to make it grammatically correct, as long as the grammatical error is not salient to the story. The theory behind the rule is that the ethic of truthfulness yields to the principle of doing no harm (embarrassment) to persons identified in stories. At some point, that approach presents policy challenges around dialect, cultural vernacular, and education policy. But none of those reasons here would preclude changing the quote.

Regardless of where one comes down on the Barrington Times headline, I contend that the treatment of "none" as plural is now widely reflexive. And legal writers do themselves a forensic disservice by failing to consider the choice. If "not one" is the salient concept, then the treatment should be singular. A writer in argument, especially, might be served best by the singular, or even by regressing "none" to its ancestor: for example, "Not one of the bystanders was capable of aiding the plaintiff" is a more potent declaration than "none were," because the former usage emphasizes the existence of multiple counterfactuals.

Here's another front page, from The Rhode Island Wave:

The Rhode Island Wave, Aug. 2023: "Liquor World: Now Open In It's Newest Location."

The subhede on this ad reads: "Now Open / In It's Newest Location."

This is an easy one, and it's definitely wrong. "It's" is a contraction for "it is." The headline does not say, "In It Is Newest Location." The "it's" is rather a possessive and should be "its."

I recognize that the Wave is a free advertiser, and the copy in question appears (horrifically, atop the front page) in an ad. In my book, which, we've established, is unrelentingly curmudgeonly, that doesn't let the editor off the hook. (Just ask The New York Times.) The fact that the Wave is a free advertiser might, though, explain the quality of the journalistic editing.

I see "its"/"it's" errors all the time. It's disheartening. I get that "it's" is initially confusing, because, especially in formal writing, we are accustomed to apostrophes appearing in possessives more often than in contractions. But then you learn the rule, you turn six, and life moves on.

At risk of exceptionalism, I believe that the American model of law as graduate education, open to a full range of undergraduate majors, is a strength of the American legal system. Our bar is populated by a gratifying diversity of knowledge bases, skill sets, and life experiences that are little known in the five-year LL.B. model.

At the same time, and as long as our four-year higher ed system permits disciplinary focus to the exclusion of liberal arts, we in legal education bear a burden to teach American law students how to speak and write in what is for most of them their native tongue.

KTAL: Federal judge started in TV at fresh-faced age 14

Age 16, Morris S. Arnold wields a TV camera in 1954.
Photo owned by Judge Arnold.

Senior U.S. Circuit Court Judge Morris S. Arnold appeared on KTAL-TV this week (embed below) talking about his youthful career in television.

KTAL started broadcasting in Texarkana, Ark., Judge Arnold's home town, in 1953, as KCMC, using the call sign of its sister radio station that had broadcast since 1933. Born in 1941, a young Judge Arnold was captivated by the newly prevalent medium. At age 14, he got his first job at the station, a go-for for election returns. Four to five decades later, the once TV go-for and camera operator earned a reputation for libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment.

Though, notwithstanding three decades on the federal bench, it's "just a regular ol' tort case, like a slip and fall," in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, that gives Judge Arnold the "most joy," he told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette in a 2013 profile.

A polymath, Arnold—full disclosure: a cherished friend—studied engineering and classics and had an illustrious academic career before his appointment to the federal bench. With an S.J.D. from Harvard University, he served, inter alia, as professor and dean at the Indiana Maurer Law School and as a vice president and law professor at the University of Pennsylvania. President Ronald Reagan appointed Arnold to the district bench in his home jurisdiction of western Arkansas in 1985, and President George H.W. Bush appointed him to the Eighth Circuit in 1992.

Judge Arnold
Wikimedia Commons

Now on senior status, Judge Arnold still hears cases and occasionally writes opinions. But retirement from full-time service on the bench afforded him time to return to his passion for history. In the 2010s, he cleared his desk of works in progress with a series of articles for the quarterly journal of the Arkansas Historical Association. Here are his most recent five:

• Barthélémy Dit Charlot, a Colonial Arkansas Métis and Voyageur (2015);
• François Ménard, a Colonial Arkansas "Marchand" and "Habitant" (2015);
• Colonial Arkansas Women (2017);
• The Soldiers of Spain in Colonial Arkansas (2018); and
• The Quapaws and the American Revolution (2020).

The latter, a fascinating insight into the conflicted and delicate position into which the Revolution cast indigenous leaders in America—I caught up on my reading earlier this summer—was especially well received in critical circles.

Judge Arnold is the author of five books on American history in the once territory of the Louisiana Purchase, and he is a co-editor of Arkansas: A Narrative History (2d ed. 2013). The most critically acclaimed of Judge Arnold's books is the oft cited Rumble of a Distant Drum: The Quapaws and Old World Newcomers, 1673-1804 (2000), also focused on the Quapaw.

But the top Arnold book for me is The Arkansas Post of Louisiana (2017). When I visited Judge Arnold in the spring, he said he is most proud of The Arkansas Post because it was a collaboration with Gail K. Arnold, the judge's wife, who provided photographs and edited illustrations. As a veteran Arkansas hiker, I immensely enjoyed visiting the Arkansas Post National Memorial many years ago, armed with Judge Arnold's earlier writings on frontier settlement and the colonial period.

Judge Arnold's work on legal history is featured in my fall Torts class annually, as his 1979 law review article on the origins of common law is excerpted in my textbook, Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law, volume 1 (Lulu, SSRN 2023). In Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in the Fourteenth-Century Law of Torts, Arnold challenged the conventional wisdom of the renowned Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had posited that modern culpability doctrine was the achievement of a gradual common law evolution dating to medieval England.

It's often struck me that Judge Arnold has earned a remarkable legacy in both author and subject indices of historical research.

Liske translates Yeats poem with link to dystopian sci-fi

© Cyprian Liske; used by permission.

My friend and scholar-translator Cyprian Liske has prepared a Polish translation (image) of W.B. Yeats's "Aedh Wishes for the Cloths of Heaven" (1899).

Here is the Yeats original:

Had I the heavens’ embroidered cloths,
Enwrought with golden and silver light,
The blue and the dim and the dark cloths
Of night and light and the half-light,
I would spread the cloths under your feet:
But I, being poor, have only my dreams;
I have spread my dreams under your feet;
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.

Liske is a doctoral student in sustainable development and international trade law. We worked together in the American Law Program of the Columbus School of Law of The Catholic University of America and the law school of Jagiellonian University in Poland.

I don't speak Polish beyond a few words, so can't well appreciate Liske's skill as a translator. But I was intrigued by this project because, Liske informed me, the poem was inspiration for a 2002 science fiction film starring Christian Bale, Equilibrium.

The film didn't do very well. In the patriotic wake of 9/11, a dystopian parable might have been just a bit ahead of its time. I might now revisit it.  Ostensibly a romantic poem, "Cloths of Heaven" gets a lot of play in popular culture; its use in this context is compelling.  Equilibrium is set in a world in which emotion is outlawed: a response to the violence and hatred that rent the world in a third great war.  As the United States and Turkey condemn the burning of the Koran in Sweden, igniting, if you will, a perennial free speech debate, Equilibrium seems not as terribly far fetched as its précis suggests.

I just finished watching HBO's Succession (s4), and it struck me that its Sorkin-esque dialog, timing, and staging marks it as a dystopian antithesis of my beloved West Wing: respective representations of our times, now and then.  Our dystopian restatements of contemporary society, perhaps like the corporatocracy itself, seem as yet not to have found rock bottom.

TORTZ volume 1 now available to print on demand

I'm pleased to announce the publication of TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law, volume 1 of 2.

Hard copies can be printed at Lulu.com for just $30 plus shipping. A free PDF can be downloaded from SSRN.

Eight chapters cover the fundamentals of the culpability spectrum from intentional torts to negligence to strict liability. After two pilot deployments of content, in 2021 and 2022, this book will be my 1L students' Torts I textbook in fall 2023.

I anticipate publication of volume 2 in 2024.

Indian court refuses injunction of fantasy cricket league in unlicensed use of player names, likenesses

Free SVG

In case about fantasy sports, the Delhi High Court in India ruled in late April that satire, news, and art must enjoy protection from right-of-publicity liability.

The case involves athlete likenesses in fantasy sport leagues. Plaintiffs are a Singapore-incorporated fantasy sport provider that invested big money to develop non-fungible token and other electronic products making licensed use of the names and likenesses of co-plaintiff cricket athletes. The defendant business operated a less fancy but "explosive[ly]" popular online fantasy league service using the players' name and likenesses without licenses.

The court determined that Indian law does recognize right of publicity, inspired in part by the example of statutory tort actions in the United States. Accordingly, "passing off" is essential to infringement, the court held, meaning that customers must reasonably understand the defendant's proffered product as bearing the subject's endorsement. 

The court denied preliminary injunction. In the instant case, evidence was lacking that the defendant made such a representation or that reasonable users made such a mistake. To the contrary, the defendant online disclaimed any affiliation with or license from the depicted players.

The court also recognized a constitutional dimension to the position of the defense in the case, opining that "use of celebrity names, images for the purposes of lampooning, satire, parodies, art, scholarship, music, academics, news and other similar uses would be permissible as facets of the right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and would not fall foul to the tort of infringement of the right of publicity."

The case is Digital Collectibles Pte. v. Galactus Funware Technology Pte., 2023:DHC:2796, CS(COMM) 108/2023, 2023 LiveLaw (Del) 345 (Delhi High Ct. Apr. 26, 2023) (India), decided by Judge Amit Bansal, who holds an LL.M. from Northwestern University.

HT @ Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan.