Tort-contract distinction cannot block damage multiplier, Mass. high court holds in lease dispute

Photo by Yonkers Honda CC BY-SA 2.0 via Flickr

A landlord may not rely on a limitation-of-liability provision in a commercial lease to evade a damage multiplier under Massachusetts consumer protection law, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled in January, regardless of whether the case is characterized as tort or contract.

The dispute arose between plaintiff-tenant Majestic Honda and its LLC landlord, owned by Alfredo Dos Anjos. Majestic accused the defendant of bad-faith lease termination, and the trial court agreed.

Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A, under which Majestic brought its case, is a famously potent statutory remedy. Ostensibly its section 11 is a consumer protection law like any of the unfair trade practices prohibitions found throughout the states. But the statute has been read broadly in Massachusetts to operate at or beyond the margins of what lawyers usually regard as "consumer protection."

Moreover, section 11 authorizes double and treble damage awards upon "willful or knowing" misconduct. Massachusetts does not recognize punitive damages at common law, only by statute. Chapter 93A also has a four-year statute of limitations, sometimes an advantage to plaintiffs over the usual Massachusetts limitations period of three years for most tort actions.

Thus, as a result of permissive construction and powerful incentives for plaintiffs, chapter 93A is invoked frequently in what would be merely common law tort cases in other states, even to the exclusion of the common law claim in Massachusetts. Chapter 93A also is used in public enforcement, as in the Attorney General's present litigation to hold Big Oil accountable for climate change.

Tort and contract claims can be subsumed into the same 93A framework, blurring the classical distinction. The distinction is especially weak in product liability cases, in which Massachusetts plaintiffs almost always rely on 93A, in part because the commonwealth has recognized strict product liability as an extension of quasi-contractual warranty rather than as an evolution of common law negligence.

I am not a Massachusetts lawyer, and I am careful to disclaim to my 1L torts students that I am not well versed in 93A practice. It is its own field and cannot be folded into tort fundamentals. But, I admonish, they should endeavor to learn more if they intend to practice tort litigation in Massachusetts. My supremely talented colleague Professor Jim Freely once regularly taught a 93A course, but I don't think it's been offered since he was drafted (no pun intended) into the legal skills program.

Insofar as section 93A's damage multiplier is punitive in nature, it should not be disclaimable by a tort defendant, else the legislature's intended deterrent effect would be rendered moot. Upon this logic, the Massachusetts Appeals Court looked in past cases to discern whether the plaintiff's claim analogized more closely to tort or contract, to determine whether a limitation-of-liability provision should be allowed to nullify extraordinary statutory damages.

In fairness to the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court did roughly the same thing in 2018 when it applied a statute of repose for tort claims arising from real property to a 93A action, even though 93A itself has no repose period; three justices dissented from that ruling.

Here, the analogical approach is wrong, the Supreme Judicial Court decided unanimously. The court wrote, per Justice Scott Kafker, "Because G. L. c. 93A establishes causes of action that blur the distinction between tort and contract claims, incorporating elements of both, we do not adopt this formulation." The court further explained,

Our cases have also pointed out that a c. 93A claim is difficult to pigeonhole into discrete tort or contract categories, as c. 93A violations tend to involve elements of both tort and breach of contract, blurring the lines between the two. As we explained in [prior cases], "[t]he relief available under c. 93A is 'sui generis,'" being "neither wholly tortious nor wholly contractual in nature." Hence, a "cause of action under c. 93A is 'not dependent on traditional tort or contract law concepts for its definition.'"

After all, the court reasoned, the legislative intention to deter willful or knowing misconduct is not a function of whether the wrong is a tort or a breach of contract.

At a theoretical level, the vast gray area of 93A in Massachusetts law might have broader implications for the classical distinction between tort and contract, namely, whether the distinction will or should persist at all in contemporary common law. Massachusetts 93A practice might prove instructive as courts in many common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, reconsider the vitality of the so-called "economic loss rule," a historic marker of the tort-contract distinction that forbade tort actions in the absence of physical injury or damage.

The case is H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South Washington Street, LLC, No. SJC-13088 (Mass. Jan. 24, 2022).

Student comparative law research spans sport, schools, drugs, recidivism, regs, copyright, crypto

He who learns teaches.

—widely cited as an Ethiopian or African proverb, the statement has parallels in other cultures and is sometimes paired with the Latin "qui docet discit," "he who teaches learns"

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Image by Gordon Johnson via Pixabay

Because we are reasonable people, we can all agree that Torts is the most important course in law school.

Comparative Law, however, takes the cake as the best course to teach. That's because one can teach it without exhaustive knowledge of the doctrinal subject matter. For no one knows the law of every jurisdiction in the world.

Thus, for me and my co-teacher, a supremely skilled embedded librarian, Comparative Law is a never-ending opportunity to learn from our students. And our students in spring 2022, as in past semesters, had plenty to teach us.

This is a selection of the ambitious paper topics that our Comparative Law students tackled in the spring.

United States, Vietnam. Firaas Z. Akbar, Free Enterprise Versus Freedom to Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis of Entrepreneurship Rights in the United States and Vietnam. Despite pronounced cultural and ideological differences between the republics of the United States and Vietnam, one of the goals shared by both societies is promoting entrepreneurship among their citizens. While not explicitly provided by the U.S. Constitution, free enterprise has impliedly been read into its language through a series of judicial decisions since the nation's founding, within a legal system where courts are bound to follow precedent. Vietnam enshrined a broad right to entrepreneurship into its constitution as part of an effort to transition to a more market-friendly economy. Yet constitutionalism under Vietnam's civil law system works differently, where rights require legislative substantiation to take effect. This analysis explores how Vietnam gives effect to this right and compares this model of promoting entrepreneurship to the U.S. approach.

United Kingdom (pre-/post- Brexit), Switzerland. Alessandro Balbo Forero, The Impact of Brexit on Football. There has been much debate and discussion regarding the UK exit from the European Union in 2020. Brexit had an impact on the sports industry as a whole, leading to debate and discussion by legal sport scholars on football, in particular, the English Premier League (EPL), and whether Brexit is good or bad. The unrestricted movement of players across the European Union is the catalyst for competition and player power. Prior to Brexit, players enjoyed the freedom of movement between EU Member States when their contracts expired. The current Governing Body Endorsement (GBE) requirements established after Brexit restrict player movement, and, thus, players are no longer able to sign with teams in the UK without first satisfying specific requirements that are tied to their respective countries' FIFA rankings. Although players are able to appeal to an exception panel, it is still not guaranteed to be granted a GBE. The Swiss model of player immigration would provide the UK with the best of both worlds. Brexit would still be in place, thus enjoying the benefits along with it, like unrestricted EU broadcasting regulations, and players would enjoy the freedom of movement once granted by the European Court of Justice in the Bosman ruling. The Swiss model satisfies both the FA and EPL, because highly qualified, homegrown players would continue to be produced while maintaining the multicultural, global product that is the EPL.

United States, England. Elizabeth Cabral-Townson, Using a Comparative Analysis of Special Education Disputes in the United States and England to Develop a Model that Better Serves Schools and Families.  Every country with a formal public education system has a responsibility to meet the needs of all enrolled students, including those with disabilities. Many countries have developed laws or regulations that describe their special education processes and procedures. In some instances, parents and school districts disagree about what a student with a disability requires to make progress in school. In these instances, there are several different dispute resolution techniques that can be an efficient way to resolve issues. Both the United States and England have developed laws and regulations specifically related to special education disputes. There are both similarities and differences to how the United States and England handle special education disputes, and elements from each country may be used to develop a more universal model. A preferred approach may be a consistently used three-tiered system that ensures the timely resolution of special education disputes using no-cost or low-cost options.

United States, Norway. Emma Clune, Prison Education as Means to Reduce Recidivism: A Comparative Analysis of the Effects of Prison Education Programs and Principles of Punishment in Norway and the United States. Access to prison education programs differs greatly between the United States and Norway. In the United States, prison education programs are not widely accessible due to issues such as lack of funding and resources. The programs that are available do not often prepare incarcerated persons for workplace environments after release. In Norway, where education is viewed as a fundamental right, all inmates are eligible to participate in education programs, and every prison facility provides access to academic and vocational programming. Norwegian prison education programs operate based on the "principle of normality," the idea that life inside prison should emulate life after release.  Research confirms that participation in educational programming while incarcerated reduces an offender's likelihood of recidivating by improving the offender's mental health and increasing the likelihood of employment after release. Emulating Norway's prison education programs and adopting the principles of Norway's penal system could be a means to reduce high recidivism rates and ultimately decrease the rapidly growing prison population in the United States.

United States, Canada. Judith Patricia Cruz Caballero, A Comparative Analysis of Refugee Law in the United States and Canada. The United States and Canada are world-leading nations for their international law policies. Refugees are a group of the population displaced from their home country due to war, discrimination, or violence. The United Nations created the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to create a better humanitarian world. However, as the refugee crisis continue to increase over the next few years, the refugee policies of host nations will impact the support refugees receive. This paper examines refugees' procedures, immigration processes, and funding structures provided to refugees in both countries. In addition, the paper aims to compare each
nation's method of handling refugees in a time of international crisis. Finally, after analyzing each nation's policy areas, the paper provides recommendations to help increase the efficiency and effectiveness of refugee response in the United States and Canada.

Netherlands, Colorado. Ryan Gulley, Comparing the Legalization of Drugs in the Netherlands and Colorado: Recommendations for the Future. This paper compares the similarities and differences between the recent implementation of changes regarding drug use within the legal systems of the country of the Netherlands and the state of Colorado. The paper begins with a brief introduction to both systems. Following the introduction is a brief history of the criminalization of drugs within the two systems, as well as the reason for the changes that have been made in response. The current landscape of the legal systems will then be laid out, including where society stands today. I then examine the effects of those changes. The paper concludes by providing recommendations based on the lessons learned from the changes that were made in both areas.

United States, European Union. Austin Gutierrez, SOPA & PIPA vs. Article 17 "Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market." This paper compares the failed U.S. legislation, the Protect IP Act (PIPA) and Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA), to the currently enacted Directive (EU) 2019/790, Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, with a focus on Article 17. This paper goes through the history and then the past and current critiques of each legislation. This paper then creates a hypothetical bill using methodologies from both legislations. This paper has discovered that the current critics of U.S. online piracy protection believe that the U.S. should legislate in favor of website blocking. The EU critics believe that the authorization requirement establishes a mandatory requirement of general monitoring, which may be too much of a request from the website owners. In conclusion, this paper decides that it is in the best interest of the United States to let other nations develop and test online piracy protection while protecting current copyright holders through the use of website blocking for piracy focused websites. 

United States, China, Germany. Christopher Hampton, Comparative Analysis of Crypto Assets/Blockchain Regulation Between PRC & Germany to Form a Spectrum Based Guide for Impending U.S. Regulations. Crypto-assets and blockchain technology have created an array of regulatory responses globally, most of which address the risks associated with illicit activities, consumer protection, and financial stability. The choice of fitting crypto into traditional frameworks, modifying existing regimes, or forming bespoke regulations to address these risks inherently creates strategic variations across the board. However, this range of approaches creates a guiding spectrum for late movers, namely the United States, to survey during impending crypto-asset deliberations. By synthesizing Germany's and China's leading, yet antithetical, approaches to the same priorities, this paper reveals both sides of the spectrum (i.e., acceptance v. full ban), details how the respective strategies address the given concerns, and weighs perceived strengths and weaknesses of their enactments. Further, upon consideration of the United States' current regulatory uncertainty and objectives, recommendations are proffered in promotion of sustainable growth and innovation for the industry. Although the collective knowledge necessary for proper regulations is not solely within this analysis, adequate and sustainable decisions can only be made through considerations as equally expansive and flexible as the emerging industry of focus. Similarly limited, policymakers would be prudent to include market participants in their deliberations and promote international teamwork. Ultimately, regulatory clarity is necessary in any regard for the industry to truly evolve, though the path of evolution depends heavily on U.S. decisions. 

Germany, Russia.  Nicholas Hansen, A Comparative Examination of Environmental Regulatory Policy Models in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation. Regulation of the economic activities of any sovereign nation can be foundational in determinations of status, power, and recognition in modern geopolitics. In modern environmental regulation theory, two primary characterizations of economic regulations are found. This analysis compares the use of "process-integrated" environmental policy, to the use of "end-of-pipe" environmental policy, and their relative benefits and hindrances. Process-integrated regulatory policy involves a more direct intervention in production processes and business action, whereas end-of-pipe regulatory policy involves the establishment of penalties for businesses that exceed their allotted carbon output, and violate industrial or automotive emission laws.  These policies have disparate impacts on the economic health of the sovereignties in which they are employed, differing levels of legal security for businesses operating in these sovereignties, and these impacts have been modeled and cataloged in this article.

This author posits that the time-frame around which either model is implemented, and the substantive form of these model regulations have an indirect impact on the long-term economic growth and propensity for foreign investment.  This hypothesis is most principally demonstrated by a comparative examination of the "process-integrated" model presently in use by the Federal Republic of Germany, and the "end-of-pipe" model presently in use by the Russian Federation. This article seeks to explain the characterization of the German and Russian regulatory models as an "end-of-pipe" or "process integrated" model and the statistical and legal evidence that supports this conclusion. In addition, Explanations of the German and Russian environmental regulation and their relative impact on the economic health and growth of their respective sovereignties are given.

Israel, Palestine. Rachel Kilgallen, The Unique Legal Systems of Israeli Settlements. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world's most enduring conflicts, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip reaching 55 years. Within Israeli settlements, where Israelis and Palestinians must coexist, an abounding number of controversies have arisen. One such controversy revolves around the legal system adopted within these settlements. Upon Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (along with the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights) in June 1967, the Israeli military immediately established military courts in both territories in order to try offenses harming security and public order. Technically speaking, Israeli military and civilian courts hold "concurrent" jurisdiction to try Israelis for offenses related to security. The policy for the last four decades, however, has been to refrain from prosecuting Israeli civilians in the military system, despite critiques that doing so constitutes partial annexation of occupied territory. The result is that Israeli and Palestinian neighbors accused of committing the very same crimes in the very same territory are arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced in drastically different systems—each featuring staggeringly disparate levels of due process protections. The International community seems to be in concurrence that Israel's actions regarding its settlements violate international law on many levels. At this point in time, all measures taken against Israel, in consequence, have been in vain. The longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestine endures.

United States, Germany. Samantha Rapping, The Psychological Toll of Being Prosecuted as an Adult: A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile Prosecution and Incarceration in the United States and Germany. The United States has one of the most complex criminal justice systems, which significantly differs from other systems in the world, specifically Germany. One prominent difference between these two countries is how they handle juvenile offenders. The United States focuses merely on punishment and incapacitation, whereas Germany focuses on education and rehabilitation. As a result of the harsh treatment that juvenile offenders endure, such as frequent sexual and physical abuse, their mental health severely plummets. Juveniles are at a higher risk for suicide, depression, and anxiety. As a consequence, juvenile offenders are likely to re-offend post-release. Germany’s recidivism rates are extremely low as a result of the educational approaches and opportunities that are available to juvenile inmates such as therapy, metalworking, farming, etc. The positive reinforcement that occurs while juveniles are incarcerated leads to an increase in a juvenile inmates overall attitude and positive outlook for the future. The United States should adopt Germany's educational approach to its juvenile offenders.

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Students: If you spy any errors here, don't hesitate to contact me for correction. If you were in this class and I failed to include you here, that's because I don't have an abstract from you. Please send one, and I'll be happy to add it.

Publishers and employers: Contact me if I can help put you in touch with any of these promising law students, some of whom are now recent grads!

Flags from Flagpedia.net.

Judge excoriates city in public records row

Worcester, Mass., City Hall
(Mass. Office of Travel & Tourism CC BY-ND 2.0 via Flickr)

In a remarkable opinion in January 2022, the Massachusetts Superior Court excoriated the city of Worcester, Massachusetts, for failure to comply with a newspaper's public records request investigating police misconduct.

In 2018, GateHouse Media, owner of the Worcester Telegram & Gazette and a subsidiary of Gannett, filed a Massachusetts freedom of information act (FOIA) request for files related to investigations of Worcester police in civil rights matters. The Telegram's interest was spurred by Worcester attorney Hector E. Pineiro, who was upset by police interaction with his son.

The city resisted production of the records because, it argued, they were part of ongoing litigation involving police officers. The Massachusetts FOIA has no litigation exemption per se, but officials shield some records under the deliberative process exemption, relating to policy positions still in development. The city grossly over-relied on that strategy, the court concluded in June 2021 after a rare FOIA trial.

GateHouse Media persisted with its case even after shaking lose the records, demanding that the city be permanently enjoined from similar baseless argument in the future and be charged with punitive damages. In January, the Superior Court, per Justice Janet Kenton-Walker, substantially sided with GateHouse, finding that the city had acted in bad faith and needlessly protracted the litigation and costs for years.

Not only did the city rely erroneously on the text of statute, Justice Kenton-Walker opined, it "cherry-picked certain language from ... cases, taking it out of context." And the city had an ugly history with the same issue. The court explained:

[T]he court cannot ignore that [the city] originally took [its] position in spite of the fact that the city was one of the parties to, and thus aware of, Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). In that case, the Appeals Court held that materials in a "Worcester police department internal affairs file ... compiled during an investigation of a citizen complaint," were public records. That court stated explicitly that "[i]t would be odd, indeed, to shield from the light of public scrutiny as 'personnel [file] or information' the workings and determinations of a process whose quintessential purpose is to inspire public confidence" (emphasis added).

The court declined to award an injunction, reasoning that the threat of litigation should provide sufficient deterrence. "Simply put, the court expects the city to follow the law now and in the future," the judge wrote.

But the court did order the city to pay $5,000 in "punitive damages." That's at the top of a range allowed by state law when public officials act in bad faith. The money goes to the state Public Records Assistance Fund, rather than to the plaintiff.

According to the Telegram in February, Pineiro said that "he believes the city fought 'tooth and nail' to avoid producing the records because it did not want the public to see a police internal disciplinary process he labeled a 'sham.'"

The city wrote in a statement, the Telegram reported, that it would "move on" and not appeal.

The case is GateHouse Media, LLC v. City of Worcester, No. 1885CV1526A (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2022).

Qatar drops beIN sport piracy claim as World Cup nears

Sideline interview with beIN
(Ronnie Macdonald CC BY 2.0 via Flickr)

Qatar withdrew its complaint in April in the World Trade Organization against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over piracy of Qatari beIN Media Group sport broadcasts.

I wrote about this dispute in May 2020. A pirate outfit cheekily called "beOutQ" was rebroadcasting beIN content in the KSA without a copyright license. Riyadh disclaimed responsibility. But there was little doubt that the Saudis at least looked the other way, if not sponsored the piracy, as the two nations were locked in a tense diplomatic standoff and Qatar was isolated by a regional embargo. Read more background from James Dorsey.

Now World Cup 2022 in Qatar is focusing global attention on the Middle East. Neither nation stands to gain from negative publicity, least of all heightened attention to human rights issues (see Dorsey this week), so Qatar and the KSA are trying to work past their differences. They both joined a statement of the Gulf Cooperation Council signed at al-Ula after a summit in January 2021 (Middle East Institute analysis), and they have been working through the implications since. BeIN has broadcast rights to the World Cup, so setting to rest that piece of the dispute made the agenda.

Alyssa Aquino wrote further analysis of the Qatari withdrawal of the WTO complaint for Law 360 in April. The matter in the WTO was No. WT/DS567/11 (terminated Apr. 25, 2022).

'Sudanese Bubba' will show you Sudan

You might not even remember it, but for a short time in the fall of 2020, we thought the pandemic was over. We were just too cute.

Wrong as we were, I went to Sudan then. And there I met a spectacular person called Salma EL-Sheikh, who smoothed my way around the country.

Well Salma is doing her part to drag the world kicking and screaming out of the pandemic, and she now has her own tourism company, Sudanese Bubba. The name "comes from our Sudanese jewelry (Gamar Bubba), moon–shaped golden earring (Gamar Boba)," Salma explains. "Kind of earrings women used to wear at the ancient time, until this moment."

I receive absolutely nothing but a karmic re-balance when I tell you, Salma has my absolute and unqualified recommendation.

Local kids atop Jebel Barka (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 RJ Peltz-Steele)

Sudan is a stunning place. Its pyramids and ancient sites are magical. You will find yourself scrambling up and over remote dunes to see the next marvel with a feel of wild intimacy that is unknowable in well trampled tourist traps (I'm lookin' at you, Cairo).

Sudan likewise offers a fascinating ethnographic and political experience. Its pioneering efforts to mix Islamic and western law into a republican formula, and its fraught relationships with neighboring South Sudan and Ethiopia all amount to a nation that is very much a work in progress. 

For all the range of experience on offer, my fondest memory is sitting with friends and locals on crates in a Khartoum street at the serving station of "our tea lady."

Let Salma help to make your memories of Sudan!

Me and my mates on the road in Sudan (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 RJ Peltz-Steele)

 

Belgian-waffle makers battle over whose doughy goodness won pride of place on Oprah's list

PxHere CC0

Two Massachusetts business are embroiled in a mouth-watering lawsuit over waffles and Oprah.

Oprah's 2021 "favorite things" featured "Eastern Standard Provisions Gourmet Liège Belgian Waffle Gift Box." Yum.

Eastern Standard Provisions is based in Waltham, Mass., and lists its "Classic Liège Belgian Waffles" for sale online. Here's the pitch:

Our artisanal Classic Liège Belgian Waffles are crafted with real butter and pearl sugar imported from Belgium for a light, sweet crunch. Our Classic Liège Belgian Waffles are different than other waffles you may be used to. Most waffles are made with batter, but our Classic Liège Belgian Waffles are made from dough delivering a soft, brioche-like texture and a one-of-a-kind waffle experience.

This is not Eastern Standard's Oprah debut. Its "artisanal soft pretzels" made the grade in 2019.

But wait. Based in Attleboro, Mass., the Burgundian gourmet street-food brassiere claims in a lawsuit (via WCVB) that Oprah picked Burgundian waffles for the list, because Eastern Standard ripped off the Burgundian recipe it had learned under a non-disclosure agreement when the two explored a co-branding venture.

According to the lawsuit, Burgundian founder Shane Matlock learned how to make the Liège waffles while serving in the U.S. Army, when, for three of 15 years, he was stationed on the France-Belgium border, and, the Burgundian website says, he premiered the waffles in Providence, Rhode Island (my home state, near Attleboro) in 2017.

All I know for sure is that I now have a craving for waffles.

The case is The Burgundian LLC v. Hawthorne Food Co. (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk Dep't Bus. Litig. Sess. filed Feb. 3, 2022).  The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, breach of contract, violation of state trade secret law, passing off, false advertising, and unfair trade practices.

Historian explores Grant statue's African odyssey

My photo from Bolama in 2020
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Martin H. "Jay" Joyce, author and my colleague in the exploration of historical curiosities, has authored a new article about the origins and winding story of the statue of U.S. President Ulysses S Grant on the island of Bolama in Guinea-Bissau and its two appearances on Bissauan postage stamps.

I have written about the Grant doppleganger's odyssey previously, in March 2020, when I got some of the facts wrong, and in November 2020, when I corrected and updated the record. Now Joyce has dived deep. He teases his piece thus:

In the March-April 2020 issue of Topical Time, Mr. George Ruppel recounted the story of why Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) issued stamps in 1946 and again in 1970, featuring Ulysses S. Grant. Grant was honored for arbitrating a dispute between Portugal and Great Britain during his presidential administration in favor of Portugal. The crux of the dispute involved territorial rights over the island of Bolama, just off West Africa’s coast.... In the mid-twentieth century, Bolama frequently appeared in the philatelic press because of the Pan-American Airways Clipper airmail routes, which used Bolama as a stopping point before proceeding across the South Atlantic....

An internet search for statues of American presidents around the world rarely includes this statue. Why not? As former ABC News radio commentator Paul Harvey would say, "Here's the rest of the story...."

The article is Ulysses S. Grant in Portuguese Guinea—the Rest of the Story, Topical Time, May-June 2022, at 60. Topical Time is the journal of the American Topical Association.

Joyce is a 1974 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He is the author of Postmarked West Point: A US Postal History of West Point and its Graduates, a winner of a Vermeil award at the 2021 Great American Stamp Show. His forthcoming work from La Posta Publications is The West Point Post Office: 1815-1981: Keeping It All in the Family—Nepotism, Paternalism and Political Patronage, ... and Dedication to the Corps.

Court denies Exxon anti-SLAPP relief in Mass. climate claims; European court bemoans Russian SLAPP

AG Maura Healey

The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute does not work in defense of Attorney General enforcement actions, the Supreme Judicial Court decided in May in climate change litigation against Exxon Mobil Corp. Europe and the UK, meanwhile, are working out their approaches to anti-SLAPP.

I am in general anti anti-SLAPP, because the statutes are drawn too broadly. I recited my lamentations in April 2021. I support anti-SLAPP in principle when it works the way it was intended, but broadly drawn anti-SLAPP statutes create innumerable headaches and are used to protect Goliath from David as often as the other way around. Exxon's attempted reliance on the law fits the mold.

With the usual American MO, anti-SLAPP statutes try to slap an ill-fitting patchwork fix on a systemic problem, which is transaction costs in civil litigation, declaring the problem solved while in fact it festers, rotting social and political institutions from the inside out. Only when a bridge collapses does everybody momentarily notice, and then we move on.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court narrowly saved the bridge from collapse this time by rejecting Exxon Mobil's invocation of the commonwealth's typically broad anti-SLAPP statute. Exxon is defending itself against Attorney General Maura Healey. The AG accuses Exxon of deceptive statements that concealed what Big Oil knew about the climate risk of fossil fuel extraction, thus, responsibility for climate change. 

State and locality climate change lawsuits against Big Oil are proliferating in the United States and the world right now, as governments try to figure out where they will get the money to bolster infrastructure against rising sea levels and tempestuous weather events. In the context of "super torts," I wrote in November 2020 about the lawsuit against Big Oil by my home state of Rhode Island. By focusing on claims in state law, public plaintiffs such as my childhood hometown of Baltimore have managed to steer their claims into state court, evading the impact of a U.S. Supreme Court inclination to see the claims in federal court, as Big Oil defendants would prefer.

Accordingly, AG Healey is pursuing the commonwealth claim under Massachusetts's expansive unfair and deceptive practices act, chapter 93A. The powerful law affords double and treble damages and attorney fees in cases of willful and knowing violations, and it can be used as a private or public enforcement mechanism.

Exxon attempted to use the commonwealth's anti-SLAPP statute in its defense. The essence of Exxon's public statements about the environmental safety fossil fuels constituted participation in the public marketplace of ideas, Exxon asserts, so the AG's persecution is just the sort of action that anti-SLAPP should head off.

One limitation, thankfully, in the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law is that it hinges on petition activity, not merely free speech. There is some margin around the word "petition," as the statute draws in public statements "reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue" by government. But the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be triggered simply because whatever civil wrong the defendant is accused of was accomplished by way of communication.

The AG objected to Exxon's invocation of anti-SLAPP on this distinction, because Big Oil made plenty of problematic statements to the public. I think she's right. But the court did not get that far. Rather, the court held in favor of the AG on her alternative argument, that the anti-SLAPP statute simply does not apply to public enforcement actions by the AG.

There is a questionable logic to Exxon's theory that petitioning must be protected against attack when the attacker is the petition-ee, government. A petitioner might be expected instead to make a First Amendment retaliation claim, if the attack theory holds up. Also, the anti-SLAPP statute, in a second provision, authorizes intervention by the AG on behalf of anti-SLAPP movants. So the legislature knew how to say "attorney general" when it wanted to, and the AG isn't mentioned anywhere else.

More importantly, the Supreme Judicial Court held, defense against a public enforcement action is not consistent with the legislative purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute: "The legislative history makes clear that the motivation for the anti-SLAPP statute was vexatious, private lawsuits, especially ones filed by developers to prevent local opposition to zoning approval." That's the paradigmatic case that gave birth to anti-SLAPP in 1988.

The court observed that its holding accords with one other jurisdiction that has considered the same problem. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine declined to apply its anti-SLAPP statute in a municipal enforcement action for a zoning violation, despite the would-be movant's assertion of victimization.

Curious, though, that mass-media-Goliath defense against defamation and privacy lawsuits didn't get a mention in the court's main text. In a telling footnote, the court opined:

Although originally drafted with a particular purpose in mind—that is, the prevention of lawsuits used by developers to punish and dissuade those objecting to their projects in the permitting process—the anti-SLAPP statute's broadly drafted provisions, particularly its wide-ranging definition of petitioning activity, have led to a significant expansion of its application.... The ever-increasing complexity of the anti-SLAPP case law has also made resolution of these cases difficult and time consuming.... We recognize that this case law may require further reconsideration and simplification to ensure that the statutory purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute are accomplished and the orderly resolution of these cases is not disrupted.... We also note that other States have defined petitioning activity more narrowly and that bills have been filed in our Legislature to do the same....

I don't want to be an I-told-you-so, but.... 

Europe and the UK might ought take heed.

The UK invited public comment in a consultation in the spring as it ponders anti-SLAPP, and the European Commission is working out legislation now for the European Union.

In a March judgment, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognized SLAPPs as a human rights problem. The court held that a regional Russian government had violated free speech rights with a civil defamation action against an online media outlet critical of officials. 

Of course, the Massachusetts and Maine cases should only aggravate the European court's worry, because it was a public authority that was the complainant in Russia. What if AG Healey were on a crusade against news outlets, using the deceptive practices law to persecute newspapers critical of the commonwealth government? (Is that how Exxon sees itself, victimized?) Would anti-SLAPP not be an apt defense?

The problem did not wholly escape the court's notice. The court struggled to distinguish an earlier Massachusetts case, Hanover, in which the applicability of anti-SLAPP in public enforcement simply had not been challenged when a town sued a union in a row over procurement. In a final footnote, the court wrote: "We note that the union in Hanover was not seeking to employ the anti-SLAPP statute to prevent local government enforcement of laws. As the issue was not raised in that case, and is not raised here, we need not decide whether any or all local government enforcement actions are beyond the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute."

So while the court lamented the burgeoning complexity of anti-SLAPP with one breath, it opened the door to more confusion with the next.

Hanover was characterized as an abuse-of-process suit, and therein lies a suggestion, I believe and have written before, of a better way to manage SLAPPs.

The Massachusetts case is Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil, No. SJC-13211 (Mass. May 24, 2022). Justice Scott Kafker wrote the unanimous opinion. Track the case at the Climate Change Litigation Database.

The ECtHR case is OOO Memo v. Russia, No. 2840/10 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Mar. 15, 2022).

Court: Even upon liability for mere negligence, insurer may refuse to cover statutory attorney-fee award

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An insurer is not obliged to reimburse an insured for attorney fees awarded in a quasi-tort action under Massachusetts statute, the commonwealth high court held today.

The insured was a cleaning business operating under the "Servpro" banner. In the dispute underlying the instant case, the insured cleaned up a sewage spill and was held liable to a client who suffered respiratory injury from exposure to disinfectant chemicals.

The personal-injury complainant sued under the unusually broad unfair commercial practices statute, Massachusetts chapter 93A. Chapter 93A affords prevailing parties attorney fees, as well as double or treble damages for complainants able to prove "willful or knowing" violation.

Those powerful incentives tend to cause plaintiffs to abandon common law tort claims when the 93A claim is viable. So here, the plaintiff declined to prosecute her common law negligence claim and was awarded attorney fees on a prevailing 93A theory, an implied warranty of merchantability.

Subsequently, Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. declined to pay the full sum of the award, asserting that the policy did not cover the attorney-fee award.

The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, finding the plain meaning of the insurance contract controlling. The policy covered liability for "bodily injury" and "costs," the court acknowledged. But attorney fees are not "costs 'taxed' against the insured in the suit," the court held; rather, "costs" refers to "the narrower, technical meaning of court-related or nominal costs recoverable as a matter of course to prevailing parties."

The outcome is potentially devastating to small businesses that believe themselves to be insured against negligence liability. An attorney-fee award is enough to put a small business into bankruptcy, yet personal-injury liability insurance typically excludes coverage for fees. 

That exclusion arises, I posit, upon the logic that fees typically are awarded in the states, if at all under "the American rule," only in cases of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, for which insurers also exclude liability. Chapter 93A makes fees much more readily accessible to prevailing plaintiffs and thereby burdens business with an unanticipated transaction cost, while affording multi-state insurers with a windfall.

Notwithstanding my principled objection to deviations from the American rule as an incoherent remedy to our problem of runaway transaction costs, I see no meaningful distinction between a personal injury award and an accompanying fee award when both are predicated on conduct indistinguishable from common law negligence. Vermont Mutual was let off the hook on a technicality, to my mind, and insureds should be entitled to the coverage they reasonably believe they bargained for. 

At minimum, going forward, the commonwealth insurance regulator should compel clear articulation of the risk to insureds of such a coverage limitation specially under chapter 93A. I won't hold my breath.

The case is Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poirier (Mass. July 6, 2022). Justice Scott L. Kafker wrote the unanimous opinion.

Privilege shields attorney from bankruptcy creditor's claim of sham proceeding to hide client's assets

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The litigation privilege shields an attorney from tort liability in the conduct of a case, the Massachusetts high court held, even if there was fraud.

The question of litigation privilege arose in connection with a bankruptcy. Creditors of a construction company alleged that its bankrupt owner had transferred assets to his wife in a sham adversarial divorce proceeding, and that their lawyer had orchestrated the plan. Besides attaching property of the debtor, the creditors sued the lawyer who had represented the debtor's wife in the divorce while the debtor appeared pro se. 

The litigation privilege protects participants in litigation, including lawyers and witnesses, from liability arising from their participation in the litigation. The privilege is often employed in defense against tort actions such as defamation and interference with contract.

The litigation privilege is better characterized as an absolute privilege, rather than a qualified privilege, though the line between the two is not always bright.  Qualified privileges usually can be vitiated by malice, whether common law "ill will" malice or actual "reckless disregard" malice.

Closer to impregnable, an absolute privilege can be vulnerable on questions of scope, but usually not on grounds of culpability. For example, the Texas Supreme Court in 2021 declined to extend the litigation privilege to protect an attorney against defamation allegations based on extra-judicial statements to media to garner pre-suit publicity for litigation by the Animal Legal Defense Fund against the commercial owner of the Houston Downtown Aquarium. The privilege failed because of the remoteness of pre-suit publicity from the litigation process, not because of the alleged scienter of the attorney.

The Supreme Judicial Court recounted the common law history of the litigation privilege.

The roots of the litigation privilege can be found in English common law, with the first reported decision dismissing an action against an attorney on the ground of the privilege issued in 1606. See Brook v. Montague ... (K.B. 1606); [T. Leigh] Anenson, Absolute Immunity From Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers [Pepp. L. Rev.] (2004).... In that case, an English court held that an attorney accused of slandering his client's adversary during a previous trial—by asserting that the adversary was a convicted felon—was immune from suit.... The court decided that "[a] counsellor in law retained hath a privilege to enforce any thing which is informed him by his client, and to give it in evidence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to examine whether it be true or false."

Courts in the United States adopted this doctrine in the Nineteenth Century and frequently cited the early English cases in doing so. See, e.g., Marsh v. Elsworth ... (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1869) [citing Brook]; Mower v. Watson [Vt. 1839 (citing Buckley v. Wood (K.B. 1591))]. Over time, the scope of the doctrine has broadened. See [Paul T.] Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame ... (1993). Nearly every State, including Massachusetts, has adopted the formulation of the privilege set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, [§ 586 (1977),] which provides:

An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.

"The privilege applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on the part of the lawyer so long as the conduct complained of has some relation to the litigation." Anenson, supra....

The court also recounted the purpose of the privilege, to "promote[] zealous advocacy by allowing attorneys 'complete freedom of expression and candor in communications in their efforts to secure justice for their clients'" (quoting Mass. precedent). The privilege simultaneously enhances judicial efficiency by precluding "meta-litigation" (my word choice) by disgruntled adversaries. (The same argument has been used to reject civil process torts.)

The litigation is not a privilege to commit wrongs, the court cautioned. Lawyers are subject to a court's inherent authority to sanction, by which a court can compel compensation to a wronged party. And lawyers are subject to bar discipline for violating the rules of professional conduct.

In the instant case, then, the complainants were not permitted to predicate an action for fraud based on the defendant-lawyer's in-court representation of the debtor's wife in the divorce proceedings.

A closer question arose as to the defendant's potential liability for conduct outside the courtroom, what the complainants characterized as orchestration of a fraudulent scheme. But the court resisted the effort to articulate a pattern of conduct apart from the litigation or expression in the course of litigation. The court cited and followed the lead of other state high courts, holding "that the litigation privilege shields an attorney from liability for actions taken during the course of litigation." The court cited a Restatement comment articulating a broad basis for the privilege "upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients."

"The litigation privilege thus applies to [the attorney's] advice and to the services he rendered," the court concluded.

The creditors are not without remedy, the court noted, evidenced by their efforts in collateral litigation to attach debtor assets notwithstanding the bankruptcy. Moreover, the court reiterated, civil immunity "would not shield the attorney from any applicable sanction for conduct contrary to the rules of professional responsibility, nor would it suggest to other attorneys that such behavior is acceptable."

The case is Bassichis v. Flores (Mass. July 1, 2022). Justice Serge Georges, Jr. wrote the unanimous opinion.