In 'Baywatch' case, court ponders discovery rule for models' tort claims over ads posted on Facebook

Models suing an adult entertainment club occasioned the high court of Massachusetts to ponder the problem of social media and the statute of limitations on media torts in a decision Wednesday.

When I heard that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided a case about Baywatch, I knew I would want to blog about it.

Alas, I was misled. "Bay Watch" in the instant matter has nothing to do with the The Hoff or 1990s TV.

Plaintiffs allege this ad depicts model Paola Cañas.
From Compl. ex. D.

Still, it's an interesting case. Bay Watch, Inc., is the owner of an adult entertainment club in Stoughton, Massachusetts, Club Alex's. In a lawsuit filed in federal district court in June 2021, six globally recognized models alleged that Club Alex's posted their images, some of them in scant swimwear, to Facebook to promote the club, even though none of the models had any association with the club. The models alleged trademark infringement, misappropriation ("right of publicity"), defamation, and conversion.

The issue in the trial court was the statute of limitations for the state tort claims. Sitting on the generous end of the spectrum, Massachusetts allows three years for media tort claims. But the ads the plaintiffs complained about appeared from 2013 to 2015. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment on the tort claims to the defendant in 2023. But on a plaintiff motion to reconsider at the end of the year, the court agreed to certify the limitations question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).

Alas, not that one (IMDb).

The plaintiffs in the trial court had tried to avail of "the discovery rule," a common law rule that tolls the statute of limitations when it would work an unfairness on a plaintiff who is reasonably not cognizant that she suffered an injury for which there might be a legally responsible actor. 

The discovery rule gets a lot of play in toxic tort cases, in which illness alleged to have resulted from exposure to toxic substances might take years to manifest, and the risk of exposure might not even have been known to the victim at the time. Buttressing his decision with gender-equity-oriented social science, the late Judge Jack Weinstein famously used the discovery rule in the 1990s to give reprieve to plaintiffs suing the makers of DES, a once widely prescribed synthetic estrogen replacement that turned out to be dangerously carcinogenic.

The discovery rule is appealing as a matter of fairness, but applying it can introduce a thorny question of fact. And there are many more thorns when the rule is invoked in a case without the clear delimiters of physical injury.

It's often said, as a default matter, that the limitations period for media torts, such as defamation, runs from the time of publication. Usually that rule works well enough. But in some cases, plaintiffs are able to invoke the discovery rule. If cases are any indication, then defamation occurs in the disruption of business relationships more often than in the pop culture paradigm of media subject versus publisher. A businessperson, for example, might think she lost a contract on the merits of a bid and only later discover that she lost the contract upon the whisper of a false and harmful rumor into the right ear.

Proliferation of media in the internet age has made courts slightly more willing to afford plaintiffs an argument for the discovery rule, because mass media publication in a sea of online content might not rise to an injured's attention as quickly as a story in the town paper in ye olden days. But courts' patience is not without limit. In the online environment, courts have adapted another rule familiar to the conventional interplay of mass media and the discovery rule. As the SJC opined, in part quoting the Massachusetts Appeals Court:

"[W]here an alleged defamatory publication is broadly circulated to the public, and did not involve concealment or confidential communications," the discovery rule will not be applied, and the cause of action will accrue upon publication, as such widespread publication should have been discovered by the plaintiff.

In other words, the limitations period runs upon publication, unless plaintiff can invoke the discovery rule because a reasonable person would not have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor, unless the thing was out there for everyone so the plaintiff should have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor—in which case we come back around to publication again.

If that sounds circular .... Right. The problem with this approach is that if a reasonable person would not have recognized harm, cause, and actor, then, by definition, the plaintiff cannot be expected to have recognized harm, cause, and actor. In tort analysis, the word "should" means "a reasonable person would."

What this approach really allows is for the court to deny the plaintiff the latitude of the discovery rule as a matter of law, and to dismiss, without having to hassle (or Hassel) with the plaintiff's reasonable cognizance as a question of fact suitable for trial. In short, what the court giveth, the court may taketh away.

And that's what happened in the instant case. The federal district court first indicated that it was inclined to dismiss because the ads appeared too long ago. When the plaintiffs tried to invoke the discovery rule, the court was skeptical. These are world famous models with agents whose job it is to scan for unlicensed uses of clients' likenesses, and with lawyers who have sued over misappropriations before. All the same, the court concluded, credibility notwithstanding, these images were out there in the world long enough that the plaintiffs should have found out about them. So no discovery rule.

What seems to have given the court pause on reconsideration is that the images here were posted on social media. A paralegal in the employ of the plaintiffs

attested that there is no software that would allow her to efficiently search for the images in question and that Internet search engines do not search social media posts. As a result, the only available method is this "particularized research of particular establishments." It is this process, presumably, that led the plaintiffs to the defendant's Facebook posts.

But that took time.

The witness had a point. Google seems slow to index social media when it does at all. Many writers have trumpeted "the death of the search engine," as users prefer to seek answers in familiar social media not as polluted as Google search results with commercialization and distortions resulting from digital marketing under the guise of "optimization."

As well, the tech giants seem to have backed off image searching. When reverse image search first came out, I had fun seeing what famous people Google thought I looked like. Now, no matter what image I start with, Google either finds me, or finds nothing, saying, "Results for people are limited. Try searching a larger [image] area." The search tools can't have gotten dumber; that must be a choice. The SJC observed in evidence in the case that Facebook terminated its image search tool in 2021.

You see it, right?

There are now reverse image search apps, by the way, especially for celebrity matches. I'm apparently a dead ringer for UK actress Natalie Dormer (image via Flickr by Gage Skidmore CC BY-SA 2.0, cropped) or the great James Earl Jones (image via Flickr by Phil Davis CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, edited). Eat your heart out, Hollywood. The Celebs app sees me.

The federal district court thus asked the SJC to clarify how the statute of limitations works in a social media world.

In a characteristically methodical opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Scott Kafker stepped through the analysis in 25 pages. The opinion is elaborative, but it adds nothing new. The approach remains: publication, unless discovery rule, unless broad circulation. At greater length in conclusion, here is the court's explanation of the discovery rule in the context of social media:

Claims ... that arise from material posted to social media platforms accrue when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has been harmed by the defendant's publication of that material. Given how vast the social media universe is on the Internet, and how access to, and the ability to search for, social media posts may vary from platform to platform and even from post to post, that determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances regarding the social media posting, including the extent of its distribution, and the accessibility and searchability of the posting. The application of the discovery rule is therefore a highly fact-specific inquiry, and the determination of whether plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were harmed by a defendant's post on social media must often be left to the finder of fact. If, however, the material posted to social media is widely distributed, and readily accessible and searchable, a judge may determine as a matter of law that the discovery rule cannot be applied.

The record was insufficient, the SJC opined, to determine how the approach should work in the instant case. The plaintiffs had equivocated, the SJC observed, when asked when they first knew about the postings. If they knew before 2018, the court reasoned, then case over. Someone should ask them that.

It is possible for the conventional "whisper" scenario to play out on social media. The SJC cited a California case, Jones v. Reekes (Cal. Ct. App. 2022), in which plaintiff had been blocked from viewing the defendant's postings. Still, the California court concluded that the postings "were otherwise available to the public[,] and the block was easily circumventable;" moreover, the plaintiff was on alert generally to the defendant's derisive commentary. So the plaintiff was precluded from availing of the discovery rule, and the date of publication controlled.

Now I can't unsee it.

Jones was thus not exceptional as a mass media case, and I don't think Bay Watch is either. I suspect the SJC was being deferential to the federal trial court, giving it a chance to make the final call. It seems to me quite clear already that the district court did what the SJC commanded when it first ruled for the defense in 2023. The SJC having confirmed the rule, there seems little more for the district court to do but reenter that judgment.

The result might seem unfair to the assiduously searching plaintiffs, or, more precisely, their agents and lawyers. But the statute of limitations furthers meritorious competing interests, including finality in freedom from legal jeopardy on the part of all publishers.

The case in the SJC is Davalos v. Bay Watch, Inc., No. SJC-13534 (Mass. Sept. 4, 2024) (Kafker, J.) (FindLaw). The case in the federal court is Davalos v. Baywatch, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-11075 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2023) (Gorton, Dist. J.) (Court Listener).

UPDATE, Sept. 12: I was saddened to hear of James Earl Jones's passing shortly after I published this post (N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2024). All joking of resemblance aside, I was a fan.

Lawyers on social media delight, inform, raise ethics questions about attorney-client relationships

An attorney panel earlier this month shared the joys and hazards of lawyers addressing the general public through social media.

A hat tip to Mississippi attorney Kye C. Handy, Balch & Bingham, for introducing me to California attorney and influencer Reb Masel on TikTok, the J.D. genius behind Reading Iconic Court Transcripts and other legal commentary.

@rebmasel i dedicate this one to Kohl’s cash #transcripts ♬ original sound - reb for the rebrand

Reb Masel's Rebuttal
(Spotify, Apple, YouTube)

Reb Masel hosts the Rebuttal podcast at Spotify, Apple, and YouTube. Read more about her at Tubefilter, where she said in fall 2023 that she practices in defense-side civil litigation "for now." If you must know more about Pepperdine Law alumna Reb Masel in the muggle world, the Daily Mail wrote about her in 2022.

Handy served on an ethics panel at the Next Generation and the Future of Business Litigation program of the Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) of the American Bar Association (ABA) at the 2024 ABA Midyear meeting in Louisville, Ky., earlier this month.

A key takeaway of the panel for attorneys: be careful you don't create an attorney-client relationship through social media posts. If giving legal advice, disclaim, disclaim, disclaim.

Florida attorney Richard Rivera said that ethical obligations may arise merely from a viewer's subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship exists. I presume there is a reasonableness check on that, but the objective measure would be lay perception, not the knowledge and experience of the attorney. Thus, a social media post can trigger an attorney's duties of confidentiality and timely response to questions.

Accordingly, Washington attorney Matthew Albrecht warned attorneys to keep up with their inboxes in all media. If a viewer or listener reaches out through a web form, social media direct messaging, etc., asking a question in response to a post, failure to respond promptly can be an ethics violation.

Moreover, an attorney must be wary of questioners who overshare, Albrecht said. They might post comments on a public website that compromise their cases, and the attorney may be obliged to delete the comments to protect the prospective client. A questioner also might provide information that puts the attorney in conflict with prior or existing clients. So an attorney with any online presence should have and adhere to a careful policy for receiving and processing incoming communications.

I wish I could count on a response from a doctor's office when I ask a question. Clearly, the bar for attorneys is higher.

Probably needless to say, some attorneys give advice in mass media that might be accurate in context and not run afoul of ethics rules, but might at the same time invite trouble in problematic misunderstanding. For example, many online videos present Texas lawyers schooling viewers on the use of force in defense of property under the state's generous castle laws. Handy shared one video by a lawyer who described a property owner vs. trespasser confrontation in which the property owner might lawfully "beat her ass."

To inform professionalism, Handy recommended to law students and new lawyers the podcast Young Lawyer Rising from the Legal Talk Network, an ABA partner.

The ABA TIPS panel comprised Albrecht, Handy, Rivera, and D.C. attorney Josephine M. Bahn.

Polisci papers track Ukraine war to Arctic, UN, internet

The war in Ukraine occasioned several papers at last weekend's annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association (NEPSA) in Mystic, Connecticut.

The NEPSA meeting offers an outstanding opportunity to preview cutting edge research presented in a low-stakes and supportive setting. Long-time NEPSA Executive Director Steven Lichtman, a professor of political science at Shippensburg University, is the brilliant maestro, setting the right collegial tone while supervising a rigorous selection process that guarantees top-shelf work.

Rotating location in New England states, NEPSA has become one of those regional conferences that is so highly regarded as to draw participation from across the country and from neighboring disciplines including law. The program is open to faculty and graduate students; law students of mine have participated in the past. This year the program opened two panels to undergraduate researchers. An extremely selective submission process yielded undergraduate presenters fully capable of going toe to toe with working scholars.

Prof. Steven Lichtman, 2016
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

There is scarcely a corner of politics and its study not being reshaped by the war in Ukraine. So it's no surprise that the war motivated many of the papers at this year's NEPSA. For all that I learned from myriad presenters, I thought I might share just a taste of takeaways related to the war.

★

A Ph.D. candidate at the University of New Hampshire (UNH), Tim Hoheneder is thinking about the effect of the Ukraine war on Arctic politics. He explained that Russia assumed the rotating chair of the eight-state Arctic Council just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The United States said it would not participate on the council during the term of the Russian chair, which ends this summer, in 2023. The United States did say it would continue to work bilaterally with other states on Arctic issues.

Now what will become of the council is up in the air. Major issues affecting global security, involving nuclear proliferation, militarization, indigenous rights, and climate change, hang in uncertainty. Hoheneder's paper is "Science Diplomacy as a Neofunctionalist Tool in a Post-Ukrainian Invasion Arctic."

★

A master's student at UNH, Sarah DeSimone is considering how the U.N. Security Council might be made functional since the Russian veto has neutralized any meaningful response to the war. She explained both the long history of attempted Security Council reform and the recent history of failed resolutions on Ukraine. 

The only reform to the Security Council to gain traction has been the recent Liechtenstein "Veto Initiative," DeSimone explained. The initiative modestly would require that a council state explain a veto. DeSimone voiced support for an amalgam of proposals that have been floated before: First, the veto should be prohibited in matters of genocide, human rights violations, and serious violations of international law. Second, in conjunction with the prohibition, an oversight mechanism should preclude countries from voting on matters in which they are directly concerned. 

Without Security Council reform, DeSimone warned, lack of credibility will render the United Nations "obsolete." DeSimone's paper is "Reforms to the Security Council: Salvaging the Liberal World Order by Examining the Crisis in Ukraine."

★

A senior at Providence College and editor-in-chief of the student newspaper, The Cowl, Sarah McLaughlin spent 46 unenviable days immersed in a Russian social media image board, Dvach (Двач). Her findings are fascinating. She discovered a world of hyper-masculine Russian nationalists almost as disgusted with Vladimir Putin as they are with Ukraine. The community evinces nostalgia for a perceived past of conservative values and faults Putin for not living up to anti-western and anti-liberal values. The community opposes the war in Ukraine and the mobilization of Russians to support it, even as participants depict the idealized Russian man as strong, hardworking, and dutiful to country. Animals, especially pigs and monkeys, represent Ukrainians, women, and Putin in demeaning memes.

McLaughlin's paper is "Russia the Bear, Putin the Pig: Russian Nationalism and the Imagined Community of Memes."

 ✪

NEPSA's next annual meeting is slated for spring 2024 in Newport, R.I.  Look for a call for papers by September with a December 2023 deadline.

Sport researchers examine athlete dissent online

Spencer Peltz, my brother, has published a co-authorship, "Athletes’ Displaced Dissent on Social Media: Triggering Agents, Message Strategies, and User-Generated Responses," in Communication Quarterly from Taylor & Francis.

Here is the abstract:

Organizational dissent is ubiquitous in task-oriented groups, including sports teams and leagues. Yet, how and to whom that dissent is voiced and the responses to dissent can vary extensively. This study investigates how professional athletes enact displaced dissent and how the public reacts via sentiment analysis of Trevor Bauer’s YouTube channel. Findings identified 53 triggering agents that were consistent with those of subordinates in traditional workplaces. A novel triggering agent of external stakeholder management was also identified, which addressed Major League Baseball’s focus and consideration for its public, their interest in baseball, and relationships with athletes. Bauer expressed his dissent via 94 messages, mainly featuring a combination of rhetorically effective strategies and emotional release. Sentiment analysis of commenters’ 1,612 replies revealed rhetorically competent messages were either unassociated with or enhanced negative sentiment, but positive sentiment was created through entertainment (i.e. humor and pressure), inclusion (i.e. coalition building), and shared ideals (i.e. inspiration).

Gregory A. Cranmer, Brandon Boatwright, Jimmy Sanderson, and Angeline Scheinbaum co-authored the article with Peltz, who was the only contributor without a Ph.D. (I know the feeling.) Cranmer is a professor at Clemson University, where he was generously supportive of Peltz, who completed his bachelor's there last year.

Peltz is a digital marketing specialist at Forefront Networks in Austin, Texas.

Google censors opinion condemning private censors

On December 31, Google blocked access to a Savory Tort post from 2019 on free speech and censorship in New Zealand.

I received this message from Google on New Year's Eve:

As you may know, our Community Guidelines (https://blogger.com/go/contentpolicy) describe the boundaries for what we allow--and don't allow--on Blogger. Your post titled "NZ prosecutions for sharing Christchurch vid would suppress news, free speech, but worse is empowerment of private censors" [my boldface] was flagged to us for review. This post was put behind a warning for readers because it contains sensitive content; the post is visible at http://www.thesavorytort.com/2019/03/nz-prosecutions-for-vid-sharing-would.html. Your blog readers must acknowledge the warning before being able to read the post/blog.

Why was your blog post put behind a warning for readers?

Your content has been evaluated according to our Adult Content policy. Please visit our Community Guidelines page linked in this email to learn more [link below]. We apply warning messages to posts that contain sensitive content. If you are interested in having the status reviewed, please update the content to adhere to Blogger's Community Guidelines. Once the content is updated, you may republish it at [URL omitted]. This will trigger a review of the post.

For more information, please review the following resources:
Terms of Service: https://www.blogger.com/go/terms
Blogger Community Guidelines: https://blogger.com/go/contentpolicy 

Sincerely,
The Blogger Team

Setting aside for a moment the irony of private censorship of a post about private censorship,* I wanted to understand what triggered the block. As the headline indicates, I fretted in the post about New Zealand criminal law being turned against online re-publishers of the horrifying video of mass shooting at a Christchurch mosque in 2019. I wrote that the lack of newsworthiness exception in New Zealand law would be problematic in U.S. First Amendment law, and the prosecution could not withstand analysis under Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). And I wrote some about how the modern internet has posed a challenge to the dated First Amendment doctrine.

Willow Brugh via Wikimedia Commons and Flickr CC BY-SA 2.0

At first, I thought maybe I linked to the objectionable video itself; I had not. I did mention by "dot com" name a problematic website from earlier internet days that was infamous in freedom-of-information circles for hosting gruesome content. But I didn't hyperlink it, and the site no longer exists at that address anyway.

The message from Google referred to the "Adult Content policy."  Here's what the policy disallows:

We do allow adult content on Blogger, including images or videos that contain nudity or sexual activity. If your blog contains adult content, please mark it as 'adult' in your Blogger settings. We may also mark blogs with adult content where the owners have not. All blogs marked as 'adult' will be placed behind an 'adult content' warning interstitial. If your blog has a warning interstitial, please do not attempt to circumvent or disable the interstitial - it is for everyone’s protection.

There are some exceptions to our adult content policy:

• Do not use Blogger as a way to make money on adult content. For example, don't create blogs that contain ads for or links to commercial porn sites.
• We do not allow illegal sexual content, including image, video or textual content that depicts or encourages rape, incest, bestiality, or necrophilia.
• Do not post or distribute private nude, sexually explicit, or non-explicit intimate and sexual images or videos without the subject’s consent. If someone has posted a private nude, sexually explicit, or non-explicit intimate and sexual image or video of you, please report it to us here [hyperlink omitted].

There's nothing remotely sexual about the 2019 post. Nor is there any depiction or description of violence, other than a reference to the mere occurrence of the tragedy, which was well reported in news media with plenty more detail.

Links to The Savory Tort were once banned from Facebook, too, for more than a year. When I inquired, Facebook sent me a form message saying that The Savory Tort violated Facebook terms of service for content. I sent further inquiries, made appeals, etc., but Facebook never clarified how the terms were violated. Indeed, Facebook never responded with other than form messages confirming the ban. For all the hoopla about a "Facebook supreme court" and thoughtful, human review of content, those avenues apparently are not open to the little people such as me.

Ultimately, a former student and labor attorney complained about the ban to Facebook, after he was denied permission to share a link to my blog. He kindly let me know. Subsequently, consequently?, and suddenly, links could be posted. The ban vanished as mysteriously as it had appeared. Not a word from Facebook, then or since.

The Facebook ban came about upon a complaint from someone who didn't like something I wrote, I suspected. That happens. For example, I wrote once about a family law case in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and I was threatened with legal action by the disappointed party. 

It's easy for someone to complain to Facebook or Google Blogger about online content. The complaint is not necessarily reviewed by a real person, or it is and the person is incompetent or indifferent. It's easier to block or take down content than arbitrate a dispute. That's why trolls and publishers have been able to abuse the notice-and-takedown system that has debilitated fair use of intellectual property.

Here, Google said that the post "was flagged to us for review" (my italics) and "has been evaluated." The choice of words, muddling passive voice notwithstanding, suggests that a third party triggered the review. How anyone, even a bot, at Google then could have found adult content, or anything in violation of the content terms, is a mystery to me. I can conclude only that the block was imposed automatically upon the complaint, with no review at all.

I would seek further explanation or ask for a human review, but that, it seems, is not an option. Google offers me the opportunity to have the block reviewed only after I "update the content to adhere to Blogger's Community Guidelines." I see no violation of the guidelines now, so I don't know what to update.

Now let's come back around to that irony, which might not be coincidental.  (Irony and coincidence are not necessarily the same thing, whatever Alanis Morissette would have you believe.)  The dangers of private online censorship was the theme of my post in 2019. The block on my post occurred in December 2022 only weeks after Elon Musk began to censor his critics on Twitter. Musk is still at it, by the way, seemingly having acceded this week to Indian government demands that Twitter censor critics of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 

At the same time in December that Musk was making headlines with Twitter censorship, the Supreme Court scheduled (for Feb. 21) the oral argument in Gonzalez v. Google LLC (track at SCOTUSblog). The case asks whether internet service providers such as Google enjoy section 230 immunity from liability in the provision of targeted content, such as search results, apart from the conduct of traditional editorial functions, akin to newspaper editors choosing letters to the editor. David McGarry explained for Reason two weeks ago, "The plaintiff is Reynaldo Gonzalez, whose daughter was murdered in a 2015 terrorist attack. [He] argues that YouTube, a Google subsidiary, should face liability because its algorithms recommended terrorist content posted on the platform that Gonzalez says aided the Islamic State."

That's a potential liability exposure that might incline Google to censor first and review later.

Perhaps someone triggered the automatic censorship of a great many online articles about private censorship, hoping to make the very point that private censorship is dangerous. If that's what happened here, I would offer a grudging salute. But I would like to see the point actually made, not just fruitlessly attempted.

At the end of the day, I'm not so broken up about the block, as opposed to a ban like Facebook's, which frustrated me no end, as I could not share content at all with family and friends. A reader who encounters a sensitive content warning wall might be only more interested to know what lies beyond. And my target audience isn't children anyway. 

I figure there's a reasonably good chance that this post will wind up behind a warning wall for having referred to a warning wall. So be it. Anyone interested enough to be investigating a four-year old story of censorship probably will get the ironist's point, and mine.

* My journalism ethics professor at Washington and Lee University in the early 1990s, the late great Lou Hodges, railed against the word "censorship" to describe private action, so would have regarded the term "private censorship" as outrageously oxymoronic. Professor Hodges was steeped in classical learning and recognized that the word "censor" comes from the Ancient Roman word referring to a public magistrate whose responsibilities, on behalf of the state, included counting people and property—thus, "census"—and the enforcement of public morals through what we now call "censorship." To honor Professor Hodges, I long insisted on the same distinction. But in recent years, I have given in to the modern trend to employ the term regardless of the private or public nature of the actor. Professor Hodges could not then have anticipated that we would soon have an "Internet" that looks very much like a public commons, thus reviving the seemingly antiquated First Amendment problem of the company town. The term "censorship" seems to me apt for a world in which transnational corporations such as Google and Meta might as well be governments from the perspective of ordinary people.

Communication policy figures as factor in U.S.-India business development after pandemic

From the Summit newsletter, with me at lower left

As promised, on February 24, I joined a panel of "INBUSH ERA World Summit 2022," an international business and policy conference organized by Amity University, India, through its flagship campus at Noida, Uttar Pradesh, near Delhi.

I delivered remarks arising from my paper, "Communication Policy as a Factor in Post-Pandemic U.S.-India Business Development," available on SSRN. Here is the abstract.

For better and worse, we live in the age of the transnational corporation. That corporate landscape is dominated by a very few actors, namely the five-trillion-U.S.-dollar oligopoly of Amazon, Apple, Meta/Facebook, Alphabet/Google, and Microsoft. That market dominance has proven to be counterproductive to countless priorities, including social and economic development, civil rights, and environmental sustainability. And the problem of Big Tech’s market dominance was dramatically exacerbated by the pandemic. Now national governments are trying to figure out what to do. Today, in the context of a program about how the United States and India can move forward together to facilitate transnational business development after the pandemic, I offer observations in two dimensions. One dimension is the jurisdictional relationship of the United States and India. The other dimension is the nature of the legal challenges in the global post-pandemic business environment. These challenges range from the broad level of the competitive marketplace to the narrow level of the information ecosystem, and, en route, pass through the problem of communication regulation, which is my own area of research.

The hosts generously presented me with an "Amity Global Academic Excellence Award."

Introducing your next ambassador of quan

Peltz

If you've consumed any social media from Clemson Tigers Baseball in the last couple of years, you're probably already a reader of the 2021 winner of Clemson's Outstanding Academic Achievement Award in Sports Communication.

Spencer Peltz, my brother, is your next ambassador of quan.  Look out when he is unleashed on the communication market.  He will not rest until you're "holding a Coke, wearing your own shoe, playing a Sega game featuring you, while singing your own song in a new commercial, starring you, broadcast during the Super Bowl, in a game that you are winning."

According to the Clemson COMMunity Roar, "[t]his award is given annually to a student in recognition of ... outstanding performance in the classroom, academic achievement, involvement in the program, creative effort, and character."  Congratulations, Spence!

CFP: Journal explores digital journalism, media literacy

My friend and colleague Dr. Manish Verma will be special editor of an upcoming edition of the Journal of Content, Community and Communication at Amity University at Madhya Pradesh, India.  Papers are invited from academics and industry experts on these themes:

• Digital media as public sphere
• Citizen and participatory journalism through digital Media
• Digital media economy
• Digital media and political communication
• Future of journalism in the digital age
• Social media as source of news
• Digital media laws and censorship
• Digital media literacy
• Journalistic ethics in digital media
• Data journalism
• Mobile and multimedia journalism
• Artificial intelligence in journalism 

Author guidelines and the official CFP are at the journal website.  Manuscripts, preferred length of 3,000 to 5,000 words, are sought no later than April 30, 2021, and will be peer reviewed.

Dr. Manish Verma

Dr. Verma recently published his own work in the journal, co-authored with Dr. Nithin Kalorth and Dr. Malvika Sagar: Information and User: Social Media Literacy in Digital Societies, 12 J. Content, Cmty. & Commc'n 263 (2020), doi:10.31620/JCCC.12.20/24.  Here is the abstract.

The information flow in digital societies has been discussed and analysed for more than a decade with close watch on social media networks. The shift from traditional forms of communication to social media enables users to gratify their daily needs of information digitally. The current paper builds on narrative analysis of selected social media active users and their digital social engagement to understand how a user and a network of users engage with information. To understand the role of social media literacy, the current paper interviews the users and correlates the findings with contemporary literature on social media. The results show that social media literacy becomes a pillar of information system, but it works in micro-level of societies at crossroads of online and offline spaces.

The authors survey digital media users to analyze the efficacy of efforts by social media platforms to enhance digital literacy to combat misinformation.  The paper concludes that the efforts are less than efficacious because they derive from a holistic vision of society and politics rather than an understanding of the literacy deficiencies of individual users.

Court: Pseudonymous WeChat user cannot be libeled

As matter of law, statement is not 'of and concerning' plaintiff

Statements about a person on a social media platform are not defamatory as a matter of law when the person is known only by a pseudonym, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held this week.

Defendant and plaintiff exchanged spiteful messages in a WeChat group.  The group comprised 437 persons and was organized to support plaintiffs accusing Harvard University of discriminating against Asian-American applicants in admission.  The defendant referred to the existence of "pink-news" about the plaintiff.  As the court explained the term, "'pink-news' is a Chinese expression that refers to sex gossip or rumors."

The trial court awarded judgment for the defendant on the pleadings on the alternative grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show damages, or that the allegation of "pink-news" was "imaginative expression" or "rhetorical hyperbole," not a factual assertion capable of defamatory meaning.

The Appeals Court affirmed on different grounds.  Plaintiff had been known in the chat group only by a pseudonym.  She failed to allege that anyone in the group knew her identity.  So she could not prove that the statement in question was "of and concerning" the plaintiff, as the test for defamation requires.

The Appeals Court disavowed the grounds of decision in the trial court.  The court's discussion of the "pink-news" issue suggested that there might have been some factual question about the meaning of the term as to preclude judgment on the pleadings.  And in a footnote, the court wrote that written communication in WeChat probably is libel, not slander, so would entitle a plaintiff at least to nominal damages under Massachusetts law.

Probably the "pink-news" allegation later would have failed for the reason the trial court supposed, even if further factual investigation was warranted.  Courts in a number of cases have recognized the hyperbolic nature of social media posts.  In 2018, recognition of "hyperbole" cost "Stormy Daniels" Stephanie Clifford her claim against Donald Trump for his tweet accusing her of a "con job."  In 2019, Elon Musk successfully defended a tweet in which he had referred to the plaintiff as "pedo guy."

At the same time, this anything-goes approach to social media means, for better and worse, that tort law cannot be relied on as a social media regulator in our age of coarsening discourse.

The case is Li v. Zeng, No. AC 19-P-1546 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 3, 2020).  The opinion was authored by Justice James R. Milkey for a unanimous panel that also comprised Justice Wendlandt and Chief Justice Green.

Media law journal covers social media and fair trial, mugshot privacy, 'true threat,' China's FOIA, more

The latest edition of the Journal of Media Law & Ethics (8:2, Fall/Winter 2020) spans a range of fascinating issues.  Here is the table of contents from editor Eric Easton and publisher University of Baltimore Law School.

Social Media Access, Jury Restraint and the Right to a Fair Trial
Zia Akhtar

To Post or Not To Post: The Ethics of Mugshot Websites
Mark Grabowski

The Trouble with “True Threats”
Eric P. Robinson & Morgan B. Hill

Merely Window Dressing or Substantial Authoritarian Transparency? Twelve Years of Enforcing China’s Version of Freedom of Information Law
Yong Tang

Free Expression or Protected Speech? Looking for the Concept of State Action in News
Christopher Terry, Jonathan Anderson, Sarah Kay Wiley, & Scott Memmel

A description from Dr. Easton:

In the current issue, British lawyer Zia Akhtar takes a hard look at the use of social media by jurors in criminal trials and the accompanying concern that the rights of a defendant may be prejudiced by the practice. The article advocates a legal code that would prohibit juror access to information about a defendant’s previous record.  

Mark Grabowski follows with an examination of so-called “mugshot” websites through the lens of the Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics. The article concludes that, while mugshot sites are not an inherently unethical journalism practice, many news outlets present mugshots utilizing ethically dubious methods that urgently need to be reformed.

The need for clear standards governing the kinds of communication that can be considered unprotected “true threats” is demonstrated by the analysis of Eric Robinson and Morgan Hill in our third article. The authors point out that, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the elusive concept, in Elonis v. United States and three subsequent cases, they failed to resolve the ambiguities of the doctrine, notwithstanding the prevalence of abusive language online.

It may surprise many of readers that freedom of information is alive, if not entirely well, in China. Based on a massive quantitative study, Yong Tang suggests that enforcement of freedom of information law in the PRC seems more forceful than many Western observers would expect, although there is scant evidence that the law has led to more accountability and better governance.

Finally, Christopher Terry and associates point out that the national press has been woefully remiss in explaining why the so-called censorship of right-wing and other voices by social media platforms is not an abridgment of First Amendment rights. While all likely readers of this journal understand the concept of “state action” in the First Amendment context, the media has generally left the public clueless.

I serve on the journal's editorial board.

Poli sci papers embrace power plant implosion, populist revolution, and constitutional convention

Here are a few of my favorite gleanings from yesterday's day one of the 2019 annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association in Portland, Maine, April 26-27, kicking off with the Brayton Point tower implosion this morning, Saturday, April 27.

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The Brayton Point cooling towers are no more
(CC BY-SA 3.0 Wikimaster97commons).

Imploded towers invite study of environmental law, policy, and urban aesthetics

Professor Aaron Ley, on the faculty at URI Political Science and also a town council member in Bristol, R.I., is working at the point where environmental law and policy meet public aesthetics.

After presenting on Friday, April 25, Ley left NEPSA to get back to the Massachusetts South Coast and witness the implosion Saturday morning, April 26, of the cooling towers at Brayton Point.  The towers have become a defining feature of the skyline in the region, so their absence in the vicinity of Fall River, Mass., and eastern Rhode Island will be an adjustment for locals (me included).  Though oft invoked as a symbol of adverse environmental impact, Ley explained at NEPSA, the towers functioned actually to mitigate the impact of the coal-fired power plant they grace, because they cooled water before it was released back into the Taunton River, sparing fish and their eggs from destructive warm water.

Ley is working interdisciplinarily with colleagues Bryce DuBois, lecturer at the Rhode Island School of Design, and Katherine LaCasse, in psychology at Rhode Island College, to complete survey and conventional research into public perceptions of urban spaces relative to environmental law and policy.  At NEPSA, Ley detailed the fascinating history of policing pollution in American waterways, from riverkeepers back to bounties on the 19th-century Hudson.

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Are we living in Google and Facebook 'company towns'?
They have courts now

Professor Kevin McGravey at Merrimack College is collecting and analyzing social media cases to see whether the First Amendment public forum doctrine still has some vitality in deciding these disputes, such as the President's ability to mute or block Twitter users.  See Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding President's blocking of users on Twitter violated First Amendment requirement of viewpoint neutrality; now on appeal to Second Circuit). Cf. Packingham v. North Carolina (U.S. 2017) (holding social media restriction on registered sex offender violated First Amendment.)

The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, pictured here after WWI, owned the
Chickasaw, Ala., company town at issue in Marsh v. Alabama after WWII.
From Destroyer History Foundation.

McGravey thinks that the old company town case of Marsh v. Alabama (U.S. 1945) is relevant.  He concedes that the Marsh analogy to a social media platform was rejected by the court in Prager University v. Google, LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (now on appeal to Ninth Circuit), in which the court refused to intervene in YouTube classifications and restrictions of PragerU's conservative political videos.  (See Eric Goldman's skepticism of the Marsh theory.)  But McGravey disagrees on a number of grounds, including the exclusivity of certain social media platforms as access avenues to public officials.

A company-town analogy doesn't get all the way to where we should be, McGravey admits, but the public forum doctrine might ought be reformed and extended to achieve worthwhile policy goals such as viewpoint neutrality on Facebook.  Still sounds like a stretch?  Well, consider, Mark F. Walsh in the latest ABA Journal reports on Facebook's plans to create a quasi-judicial appellate body to hear free speech claims.  Google already is adjudicating—internally and not transparently—right-to-erasure claims at the bidding of European data protection authorities.  Is that the town hall bell of the company town I hear?

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Federalism panel spans Rehnquist Court, religious freedom,
and the 1825 Constitutional Convention that never was

A smattering of views from a panel on federalism and the administrative state: 

• Christopher McMillion, Oklahoma Baptist University, is looking at the deep underpinnings of the "Rehnquist revolution" in federalism.  It's not about conservative politics, nor about federal power per se, he explained.  Rather, it's about protecting individual liberties—and actually the same kind of force can be witnessed in 10th-Amendment state jealousy of local officials' prerogatives relative to federal immigration enforcement.  
• Beau Breslin, Skidmore College, is working on a book on the constitutional conventions the United States has never had.  Surely Article V of the U.S. Constitution contemplated conventions with some periodicity.  What if we had had one about every human lifespan?  An 1825 Constitution probably would have opened with a lengthy declaration of rights and would have created an explicit voting franchise for white landholders, Breslin theorizes.  Oh, and Madison would have been so peeved that he sat out the Second Convention.  What would have been the implications in U.S. history for the Constitution thusly revised?  What would the Constitution look like after a 2022 convention?  Breslin examines these questions in part with reference to the real evidence of evolving state constitutions.

• 

  Maine Gov. Baxter with Irish Setter Garry Owen
  (public domain)

  James Stoner, Louisiana State University, exposed the thinly veiled nuance of religious freedom questions in the United States, from Employment Division v. Smith (U.S. 1990) to present.  The courts have looked the other way from legislative prayer, for example, and for that matter from the intertwining of government and religious practice since the days of George Washington himself.  He concludes that the judiciary is ultimately not the best forum for resolution of debate over religion in American public life.
• Sean Beienburg, Arizona State University, is researching the curious political journey of 1921-1925 Maine Governor Percival Baxter (namesake of Maine's beautiful Baxter State Park).  Republican Baxter advocated against the Ku Klux Klan at a time the Klan was making inroads with Maine Republicans.  He also staked out the political territory that would become Republicans' 20th-century economic libertarianism.  I note that Baxter was also an animal rights advocate before there was such a thing, and Maine's beautiful Baxter State Park is named for him.

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Populist revolution and American electoral politics
are both about more than red versus blue

I moderated and discussed on an afternoon panel with three fantastic papers.

• Erik Cleven, Christopher Galdieri, and Ashley Motta of Saint Anselm College are studying "down-ballot roll-off," when voters stop voting as they move down the ballot from "US Senator" to "Town Dogcatcher," or, really, "Register of Probate."  They set out to see whether there is merit in criticisms that voting college students dilute local electoral power because college students aren't interested in local races.  That turns out not to be true—not entirely true, anyway.  Looking at New Hampshire data, they found that new voters in a jurisdiction are responsible for down-ballot roll-off, and college students might just be part of that.  Other correlations arise with low education and lack of partisan tags to indicate party affiliation.  I suspect that an underlying cause is low information, a problem that dovetails with my own interest in transparency and affirmative disclosures of information to correct democratic deficit in developing political systems.



The "heartland-coastland" divide is more complicated than it seems and not
merely an expression of partisan sympathies, R.I. political scientists June
Speakman and Matthew Ulricksen show in new research.

• Two papers were strikingly complementary.  Isaac Effner, Brown University, took the normative lens off of "populism" to recount how a populist labor movement effected the 1934 West Coast waterfront strike and contributed dramatically to the evolution of organized American labor and 20th-century norms for the protection of American (and for that matter global) workers.  Don't be too quick to judge populism in scoffing at frustrated voters who support Trump, is the lesson, because populism per se can be a force for the vital expression of human rights, notwithstanding a temporary flirtation with demagoguery along the way.  Effner notes that similar populist motivations animated support in the last election for both Donald J. Trump and Bernie Sanders.
• And there comes to bear the remarkable work of Matthew Ulricksen, Community College of Rhode Island, and June Speakman, Roger Williams University and a representative in the Rhode Island legislature and former member of my Town Council in Barrington, R.I.  Ulricksen and Speakman showed some stunning maps of voting patterns in Rhode Island in the last election—I'd like to share, but they're not copyright-clear for my reuse; see the New York Times results.  Suffice to say the electoral maps reveal a deep divide in what looks like what Speakman and Ulricksen call a "heartland-coastland" divide, the former, Rhode Island's interior, Trump red, and the latter, in the salt air, Clinton blue.  Problem is, a number of data sets about who these voters are—wealth, ethnic identity, even partisan affiliation—do not actually bear out the divide.  What does?  Spoiler alert: population density.  What's more, because there is correlation with population density and not partisan loyalty, the heartland proves as receptive to Bernie Sanders's message as to Donald Trump's.  Speakman and Ulricksen identify one factor that explains voter behavior across the board: being "mad as hell."  The research leaves off there, but implications and questions abound for what will make an effective political movement in the future to capture increasingly alienated voters—and what conditions might trigger a populist revolution analogous to the 1934 general strike, or something bigger.

The annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association wraps up today, when I'll be presenting some findings on access to information and social and economic development in eastern Europe.

Claim to Facebook fortune dismissed in Mass. appeal

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals Wednesday affirmed dismissal in tort, contract, and equity claims by a software developer against principals behind Facebook-predecessor company ConnectU.

The Winklevosses (CC BY-SA 2.0 cellanr)

Wayne Chang (commencement address at UMass Amherst in 2016) alleged that he was entitled to a some portion of the $65m in cash and stock received by ConnectU's twin brothers and "bitcoin billionaires" Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss in settlement with Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg.  That mediated settlement ended litigation in California and Massachusetts in 2008; Chang initiated the instant action in 2009.  Bringing the case to a close at last, the Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed with the lower court that Chang had severed business ties with the Winklevosses before they entered settlement negotiations with Zuckerberg.  The court also affirmed award to the Winklevosses of $30,000 in costs.

The case is Chang v. Winklevoss, No. AC 18-P-329 (Mass. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2019).

UMass Law Review hosts vibrant media law symposium

Today, as advertised, the UMass Law Review hosted a symposium on media law. The program videos are all on Facebook Live.  Check my Twitter feed for hot links to speakers' handles.  Three panels were organized by media "platform," from politics to digital to entertainment, raising issues from the investigative journalism to data breach law to streaming music copyright.  The program concluded with a keynote address by Richard P. Flaggert, a DLA Piper media attorney.  Here are some highlights:

After a thoughtful welcome by UMass Law Dean Eric Mitnick, UMass Law Professor Jeremiah Ho started the program with a discussion of why media matter.  The problem of law and policy, he said, is the gulf between "what matters" and "what excites us," with the media business model tending to cater to the latter.  Professor Ho is a co-adviser of the UMass Law Review.

  

Kicking off the first panel of the day, Rep. Christopher Markey, New Bedford, Mass., attorney, Commonwealth legislator, and UMass Law alumnus, gave the political perspective.  Money has distorted news from being an educational tool to being entertainment, he explained.  People must be media literate to elicit truth from what they see, hear, and read.  Recalling his years as a district attorney, Markey said that attorneys and judges were "better" when a beat reporter was sitting in the courtroom, that journalism "makes government better."  But those beat reporters are no longer there.

Jillian Fennimore provided her perspective from inside the busy office of Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey.  A journalism graduate of the University of New Hampshire with many years experience in media, Fennimore explained the challenge of making the work of the state's law office intelligible and meaningful to citizens, whether the subject matter is investigation of the opioid crisis, antitrust enforcement, or protection of a consumer whose vacuum cleaner broke.  AG Healey cares about all of these things because she understands that these are things people care about, Fennimore said.  My Torts II class has been looking at the impact of the Healey opioid investigation on the crisis and litigation nationwide.

Peter Ubertaccio, a dean and political scientist at Stonehill College, gave an academic perspective on news and media law.  Those of us of a certain age remember the local TV news anchors of our youth, he observed.  That is not true for our children.  Journalism today is "atomized," lacking the "rhythm" of television before the information age, even if the internet is "democratiz[ing]."  There is more content available through more conduits than ever before, Ubertaccio explained, yet there is less availability of accurate information.  We are entering a golden age of television entertainment while at the same time entering a dark age of information, he said.  Incidentally, yes, I remember my anchors.  And I was privileged to have worked with Baltimore's great Al Sanders for a short time before he passed away.

A star of the first panel was Dee DeQuattro, UMass Law alumna, staff attorney for Operation Stand Down Rhode Island, and creator of the Boots on the Ground Heroes Memorial.  DeQuattro talked about her experiences in radio and television, most recently as an assignment manager for ABC6 News in Providence, Rhode Island, then her transition to a public relations and later legal capacity for the veterans organization, Operation Stand Down.  DeQuattro went to journalism school to hold power accountable in the tradition of Woodward and Bernstein, she said.  But "news doesn't work that way anymore," as bottom-line focused detracted from serious political reporting.  After covering the Boston Marathon bombing, she went to law school.  She still uses her familiarity with news media, driven by money savings and visual imagery, to manage public affairs in her nonprofit work.

Law Review co-adviser Professor Dwight Duncan moderated the second panel, on digital media.  Professor Andrew Beckerman-Rodau of Suffolk Law School and the Intellectual Property Center opened with a comprehensive overview of data protection, including data breach and Big Data analytics, in American law today.

Attorney Hollie Lussier of Bristol County Savings Bank told the audience about the large role data protection and privacy play in legal practice today, especially in the financial sector.  She warned attorneys to consider insurance liability limits, as $100,000, she said, won't cut it.  She cited a recent case of a "small" data breach that nevertheless generated a $140 million loss.  The breach could have been prevented, she said, with a $10,000 "penetration test."  Making matters more hazardous, she explained, many insurance policies will not cover consequential damages, which make up most of that mega-million loss.

Rhode Island attorney and legislator Stephen Ucci concurred on the importance of data protection to contemporary practice.  He referenced a recent in case in which only 300 records were exposed.  Despite seemingly straightforward facts, the exposure of data has different implications for each data subject, he explained; moreover, breach across state borders implicates the laws of 50 states as well as federal laws, such as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.  The complexity of even a small case is thus multiplied.  Ucci discussed the data breach legislation adopted by Rhode Island in 2015 and plans to beef up education and implementation in the near future.

UMass Law Professor Dustin Marlan moderated the third panel, on the subject of entertainment law.  Attorney and educator Richard Kent Berger started off the afternoon program talking about music copyright.  He explained the significance of the Music Modernization Act of 2018 and related legislation and pending proposals.  Royalties are now owed for digital streaming, and some pre-1972 musical works that had lost copyright protection have had their authors' royalty rights restored.  The law also revamped the approach to orphan works and afford them greater protection against loss of copyright.  Previously large content providers such as Google's YouTube were able to use a notice process on a massive scale to shake potentially orphaned works free of their copyright protection.

Seattle University Law Professor Bryan Adamson, a mass media scholar, talked about the importance of framing in media, especially in news reporting, and especially in coverage of protest movements. Media frames tend to perpetuate social stability, he explained, and as a result, tend to perpetuate racial hegemony.  The portrayals viewers see might not fairly represent the facts, and, as a result, he said, rather than contributing to the public dialog, media narratives might "derail" meaningful discussion of sensitive topics such as race and social and economic equality.

Rhode Island attorney Richard E. Kühn talked about the importance of social media to attorneys.  Social media are part of contemporary legal practice across the board, he explained, touching on areas including lawyer advertising, client counseling, evidentiary investigation and spoliation, and trial practice and voir dire.  He recited recent case rulings demonstrating that failure to take social media into account, for example in evidentiary investigation, may result in a finding of legal malpractice.

DLA Piper attorney Richard P. Flaggert (not speaking on behalf of clients or the firm) gave the keynote address of the symposium, discussing contemporary media law practice.  Flaggert, who is licensed in California, Massachusetts, and England and Wales, started off by reminding that Shakespeare's "kill all the lawyers" lines was an admonition against unethical or incompetent practice, not actually an indictment of the professional.

He then spoke about two key doctrinal developments in media law practice.  First, he discussed the potential impact on free speech and commerce of the newly adopted EU Copyright Directive, in particular the article 11 "link tax" and the article 13 "upload filter measure."  Both threaten a chilling effect, he explained.  The former purports to give copyright protection to even a "snippet"—the actual word, undefined in the law—of content, putting at risk a range of content from Google news aggregation to "your blog."  Meanwhile article 13 imposes the burden of protecting against copyright infringement on ISPs, abandoning reliance on the notice-and-takedown approach of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  As a result, even "your blog" content might be tied up for weeks or longer as ISPs mull over whether you have violated copyright, likely prompting prophylactic censorship.  I note: not unlike Europe's approach to the right to be forgotten, now miring Google in a new administrative bureaucracy, not to mention the risk of Goliath gate-keeping under non-transparent private-sector control.  

Second, Flaggert talked about the problem of copyright and live fan captures of sporting events and the like.  As technology improves and recording devices become harder to detect and control, event providers such as sporting authorities will have a more difficult time policing the difference between the odd fan photo and the HD-streaming pirate.  The French solution has been to regulate, Flaggert explained, giving near absolute control to providers, a strategy of obviously problematic dimension.  Meanwhile in the United States, no body of intellectual property law, such as federal copyright or state common law, seems up to addressing the problem.  Event providers are confounded at the choice between loss of control of their intellectual property and alienation of their fan base with its abiding affection for social media.  Meanwhile the problem poses a threat to our fine-line precedents and the delicate balance between INS v. AP IP rights and the "hot news" doctrine, which has kept the peace for decades.

The village idiot moderated the first panel. Here
he is about to laugh at one of his own bad jokes.

Once a lawyer who represented ESPN before it ceded its design to bring Premier League coverage to America, I asked Flaggert 1:1 whether NBC, with its unsatisfying and impossibly expensive array of cannibalized Premiere League coverage for U.S. viewers, intends to be destroying soccer in America, or is just doing so indifferently.  He shared his frustration with access to Liverpool matches.  I'm not sure why one would necessarily want to see Liverpool, unless they were playing directly against ManC.  But I appreciate his empathy.

A big congratulations to the UMass Law Review, especially editor Casey Shannon, for executing a superb symposium, with my sincere thanks for bringing these talents to our campus.