IP, business stories of Tupperware bankruptcy minimize female marketing pioneer, dangers of plastics

Brownie Wise on Business Week in 1954
via America Comes Alive; © fair use

The Tupperware bankruptcy has been much in the news, though the coverage has underplayed "the rest of the story" in regard to women in business and product liability.

Headlines about the bankruptcy of Tupperware suggest various takeaways for business and law. Most stories highlight the inevitable expiry of novelty in business, with the corollary imperative to innovate (Atlantic, Sept. 20). Legal angles complement coverage with intellectual property lessons on the limited life of patents (Slate) and the problem of genericization in trademark (N.Y. Times). The history and nostalgia of Tupperware is a consistent theme (Atlantic, Apr. 12).

Less often told is the story of women in business. The CBS Evening News Saturday night credited Tupperware founder Earl Tupper with having come up with the Tupperware party as a sales strategy. That's not accurate, except in a "buck stops here" sense. The role of the remarkable Brownie Wise is less often told (mentioned: Atlantic, N.Y. Times). Rachel's Vintage & Retro has the more nuanced inside story. The National Women's History Museum and Smithsonian have more. Wise, from Buford, Georgia, graced the cover of Business Week in 1954 (pictured, via America Comes Alive). PBS recounted:

While Earl Tupper hated the limelight, Brownie Wise loved it. With Tupper's blessing, the company's public relations staff promoted Wise extensively. Female executives were rare, and the strategy worked. As the company grew, Wise was on talk shows, quoted by newspapers, and pictured on the cover of numerous magazines (she was the first woman to make the cover of Business Week). But when the press suggested Wise was responsible for Tupperware's success, and that she could be equally successful selling any product, Earl Tupper grew jealous. Over time, Wise became increasingly high-handed, and she was less patient with Tupper's micro-management and unpredictable temper. In 1958, Earl Tupper unceremoniously and abruptly fired her, booting her from the multi-million dollar company she had helped build; she held no company stock and was given just one year's salary.

Journalist Bob Kealing published a book about Wise if you want to go all in. Life of the Party (2016) followed up Kealing's Tupperware, Unsealed (2008). The Takeaway at WNYC interviewed Kealing in 2016.

With regard to women in business, by the way, CBS Sunday Morning just featured GM CEO Mary Barra, who appears to be going strong in the role ten years on. I remember when Jon Stewart on The Daily Show made fun of GM's ham-fisted introduction of a first female CEO ("a car gal, an auto dame, a jalopy broad"). It seemed that Barra was practically set up to fail amid GM's embarrassing ignition-switch recall.

Phillip Pessar via Flickr CC BY 2.0

Further in the vein of product liability, another angle on Tupperware that gets little play lies at the intersection of tort law and environmental protection. Stories of Tupperware tend to hail Tupper's inventiveness in converting DuPont's wartime development of polyethylene to post-war market ubiquity. But in the last decade, revelations of risky chemical seepage from microwaved containers did untold damage to a business built on plastic food storage.

BPA is just one chemical contaminant from plastics. Its use in manufactured products has spawned EU regulation and American litigation over baby bottles and activewear, as well as consumer protection litigation over "BPA-free" green-washing. Tupperware stopped using BPA in 2010 and developed a purportedly microwave-safe line of products under the brand name "Tupperwave" (not to be confused with Australian musician Dean Terry). But the safety of any plastic in the microwave remains uncertain. And microwave ovens notwithstanding, there's plenty of justified public concern over microplastic waste in the environment, animals, and people. 

So maybe Tupperware was always destined for only finite fame. Or maybe it will reinvent itself like Teflon, another DuPont invention that seems likely to survive an accountability assault.

Consultant panning contractor was not 'improper' interference with lucrative reno deal, court holds

Rawpixel CC0 1.0

An architect whom homeowners hired to review their bills in multimillion-dollar renovation did not tortiously interfere with the reno contract when he advised them to terminate and hire another contractor, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held yesterday.

The devil in the details here is the element "improper" in the tort of interference. The same element, or the same concept, lives at the heart of many a business tort, and it's a difficult line to find. Indeed, the Appeals Court wrote that "improper" "has proved difficult to capture in a universal standard."

Interference with contract in Massachusetts law requires a contract or prospective business relation, knowing inducement to break the contract, interference by "improper motive or means," and harm to the plaintiff as a proximate result. Here, the architect told the homeowners they were being overbilled and urged them to terminate the renovation contract and hire a contractor the architect recommended. They did, and the terminated contractor sued the architect for interference with contract.

The fact pattern is common for generating interference claims, as the very job of the defendant is, in a sense, interference, that is, to run interference between consulting client and its contractor. Only "improper" was in dispute, and the plaintiff-contractor could not show evidence that measured up.

The plaintiff disputed the veracity and quality of the defendant's consultation and advice. But worst case, the court reasoned, the plaintiff might persuade a jury to find negligence or gross negligence. That can't be the basis of an interference claim, because then the interference tort would make actionable every negligent infliction of economic loss. 

The negligence tort usually requires a physical infliction of loss or harm. Business torts are exceptional in this regard, but they are predicated on a strong duty relationship, such as contract or fiduciary obligation. The plaintiff-architect and defendant-contractor here were not in privity of contract.

The court looked to an earlier case in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had allowed interference predicated on deceit or intentional misrepresentation. That can suffice to support interference. But there was no evidence here of deceit. So the court pondered what improper means short of that standard.

The court leaned heavily on the Second Restatement of Torts, which suggested, besides deceit, threats, defamation, or other conduct "innately wrongful, [and] predatory in character." Inversely, the Second Restatement advises that no interference liability can arise from "truthful information" or "honest advice within the scope of a request for advice."

The latter standard fit, the court opined. And the Restatement comments elaborated, "[N]o more than good faith is required," regardless of competence. "The rule as to honest advice applies to protect the public and private interests in freedom of communication and friendly intercourse," affording latitude especially to "the lawyer, the doctor, the clergyman, the banker, the investment, marriage or other counselor, and the efficiency expert."

The court affirmed the superior court award of summary judgment to the defendant.

There's unfortunately one point of confusion reiterated in the court's opinion. The court correctly pointed to a line of Massachusetts cases approving of "actual malice" as supporting interference claims in the context of employment, when a disgruntled terminated worker claims interference against a supervisor or corporate officer for interfering with the worker's employment contract. In this context, the courts defined "actual malice" as "spiteful, malignant purpose unrelated to a legitimate corporate interest."

Common law malice

That's not what "actual malice" means, at least in the civil context. "Actual malice" generally is a stand-in for reckless indifference and is distinguishable from "common law malice," which represents spite, ill will, or hatred. It's been observed many times that "actual malice" is unfortunately named, and it would be better had there been a different term from the start. Common law malice can be evidence of actual malice, but certainly is not required. The difference can be confusing to jurors.

The Massachusetts precedents on interference in the employment context seem to have misused the term "actual malice" to refer to common law malice. OK, I guess, as long as we all know that malevolence is the one that can evidences tortious interference.

I have some doubts, by the way, about the correctness of the Massachusetts cases that apply the interference tort in fact patterns involving a fellow worker as defendant. A basic rule of interference is that one cannot be said to have interfered tortiously with a contract to which one is a party. If the defendant was clearly acting within the scope of employment, that is, as an agent of the employer, then I don't see that a tortious interference claim can arise, and there's no need to analyze impropriety. But then, I guess, the threshold requirement overlaps with the "unrelated to a corporate legitimate interest" piece of the impropriety test.

The case is Cutting Edge Homes, Inc. v. Mayer, No. 23-P-388 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 27, 2024) (temp. slip op. posted). Justice John C. Englander wrote the opinion of a unanimous panel that also comprised Justices Ditkoff and Walsh.

Communication policy figures as factor in U.S.-India business development after pandemic

From the Summit newsletter, with me at lower left

As promised, on February 24, I joined a panel of "INBUSH ERA World Summit 2022," an international business and policy conference organized by Amity University, India, through its flagship campus at Noida, Uttar Pradesh, near Delhi.

I delivered remarks arising from my paper, "Communication Policy as a Factor in Post-Pandemic U.S.-India Business Development," available on SSRN. Here is the abstract.

For better and worse, we live in the age of the transnational corporation. That corporate landscape is dominated by a very few actors, namely the five-trillion-U.S.-dollar oligopoly of Amazon, Apple, Meta/Facebook, Alphabet/Google, and Microsoft. That market dominance has proven to be counterproductive to countless priorities, including social and economic development, civil rights, and environmental sustainability. And the problem of Big Tech’s market dominance was dramatically exacerbated by the pandemic. Now national governments are trying to figure out what to do. Today, in the context of a program about how the United States and India can move forward together to facilitate transnational business development after the pandemic, I offer observations in two dimensions. One dimension is the jurisdictional relationship of the United States and India. The other dimension is the nature of the legal challenges in the global post-pandemic business environment. These challenges range from the broad level of the competitive marketplace to the narrow level of the information ecosystem, and, en route, pass through the problem of communication regulation, which is my own area of research.

The hosts generously presented me with an "Amity Global Academic Excellence Award."