Two cases filed in the U.S. Supreme Court arise out of tort claims, if presenting more immediate questions in other doctrinal veins. Recent media coverage of each offers worthwhile observations.
U.S. Supreme Court denies government bid to argue for corporate jurisdictional defense in product liability case
Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, No. 19-368 (
SCOTUSblog), No. 19-368, might be one for the civil procedure casebooks. It is consolidated with a similar case,
Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, No. 19-369 (
SCOTUSblog). In
Montana Eighth, a Montana driver died after tire treads separated on her Ford Explorer on a state highway. In
Bandemer, the plaintiff-passenger suffered severe brain injury after the airbag failed to deploy in a Ford Crown Victoria that rear-ended a snowplow in Minnesota. Plaintiffs in both cases sued Ford upon theories including strict product liability and negligence. Ford sells cars in both Montana and Minnesota, but not these cars; they wound their way to those states through changes in ownership. Based on that attenuation, Ford contested personal jurisdiction and lost in both state supreme courts.
Darcy Covert and A.J. Wang
for Slate highlighted an interesting development behind the scenes in the
Ford cases: The Supreme Court
denied a motion by the U.S. Solicitor General to participate in oral argument. As Covert and Wang observed, the Supreme Court "[f]or roughly the last decade, ... [has] permitted the solicitor general to weigh in on any case he wants." That permissiveness exaggerated a trend in the waning decades of the 20th century in which the SG intervened in cases with diminishingly credible legitimate federal interest. The SG's cause for intervention has become more about politics, or even, my words, the realpolitik of corporatocracy, than about interests of federalism or constitutional law. Witness the
Ford cases, in which the SG
hardly articulates any credible rationale to thinly veil the executive's alignment with your
friendly neighborhood (non-governmental) U.S. Chamber of Commerce to make it that much harder for a consumer plaintiff to sue a manufacturer.
Slate's
headline described the Supreme Court's denial as "a small step in the direction of judicial independence." Let's hope so.
Black Lives Matter petitions U.S. Supreme Court after Fifth Circuit 'bobbled' freedom-of-assembly defense in negligence case
Mckesson v. Doe, No. 19-1108 (
SCOTUSblog), not yet granted
cert., is likely to turn up in a lot of books—it's already rounded the circuit in legal op-eds—because of its rich social dimensions. But the core legal problem is pretty straightforward in its articulation. Doe was a police officer severely injured when a Black Lives Matter protest, blocking a Baton Rouge highway, turned violent. Doe sued DeRay Mckesson for negligence as a protest organizer, alleging that Mckesson reasonably should have foreseen injury-causing violence. (Mckesson played a collateral role in another First Amendment case,
Johnson v. Twitter (
Complaint;
read more at The Hill), which I
talked about at
Amity Dubai last summer on the subject of social media-related liability.)
At first blush, the case looks something like one of the entrants in the unsettled First Amendment genre of negligent "inducement to violence." In one of the earliest such cases in the modern civil rights era,
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,
15 Cal. 3d 41 (1975), a radio DJ induced first arrival at a giveaway point, resulting in a fatal car accident. For the California Supreme Court,
famous Justice Stanley Mosk summarily rejected the DJ's First Amendment defense: "The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act."
Justice Mosk might have been right on those facts, but his unwillingness to recognize a slippery slope had to have been willful ignorance. The more familiar "clear and present danger" (or "incitement to imminent lawless action") doctrine and the much debated "true threat" doctrine in First Amendment law more plainly demonstrate the same problem. It's not at all clear that the RKO DJ "inflict[ed]" physical injury, and doesn't the sticks-and-stones maxim posit that that's impossible?
Cf.
James 3:6-8. I've seen many scholars try to tackle the
Weirum problem; they've all concluded either that the case was rightly decided but at the extreme of a spectrum, or that it was wrongly decided, despite the DJ's socially objectionable conduct.
The First Amendment speech-and-assembly activity in
Mckesson is more attenuated causally from physical injury than the radio broadcast in
Weirum. More time, space, and independent decision-makers separated defendant-organizer Mckesson from violence against plaintiff-Officer Doe than separated the RKO DJ from his driving listeners. And in a way that is difficult and hazardous to quantify, if nonetheless important, much greater political value—at the core of First Amendment protection—attaches to the organization of a protest against the government than to a commercial radio promotion.
Mckesson must be free of negligence liability, even if the right path to get there in First Amendment jurisprudence remains to be worked out.
Professor Eugene Volokh in Reason suggested a smart fix in the firefighter rule. That rule's nuanced underpinning in public policy invites the First Amendment to put a thumb on the scale, and such clever fixes—including legal causation, for foreseeability, itself—have helped to resolved negligent-speech injury cases before—in
a Fifth Circuit case in which now-Chief Justice Roberts represented the media defendant.
The view I want to highlight here, though, is that of University of Baltimore Law
Professor Garrett Epps in
The Atlantic,
who attacked the problem more directly through free-assembly precedent grounded firmly in civil rights-era protection of boycotts. To Epps's view, the "rogue" Fifth Circuit "has had four chances to apply a foundational First Amendment precedent, and has bobbled it each time." I hope the Supreme Court sees it the same way.
Ford Motor Co. will be scheduled for oral argument in fall 2020.
McKesson is pending
cert. consideration this spring; if the petition is granted, the case also will be scheduled for argument in the 2020-21 term.
